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INTRODUCTION
An emerging issue in U.S. asylum claims based on "membership in a par-
ticular social group" is the relevance of social visibility in determining whether
such a group exists.' Of the five protected grounds for asylum, "membership in
a particular social group" has always generated the most debate.' Until recently,
however, neither the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) nor the federal
courts focused on "social visibility" in defining this term. The dominant view of
the international community, rooted in the BIA's seminal decision in Acosta,
defines a "particular social group" based solely on the existence of an "immuta-
ble" characteristic," one that an individual either cannot change or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to identity of conscience.' Ex-
ternal perceptions are irrelevant to the Acosta standard. Among the major
common law countries, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom follow the principled "protected characteristic" approach.4
1. In order to qualify for asylum, an individual must establish "persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality
Act § lOl(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § lol(a)(42)(A) (2000). This definition of a refugee
adopts the definition set forth in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (the "Protocol"), which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, art. i, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967
Protocol]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signa-
ture July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
2. See generally Summary Conclusions: Membership of a Particular Social Group, Ex-
pert Roundtable, San Remo, September 2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION 312 (Erika Feller, Volker Tiirk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003)
[hereinafter UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS]; James C. Hathaway & Michelle
Foster, Development, Membership of a Particular Social Group, 15 INT'L J. REFU-
GEE L. 477 (2003) (noting the lack of clarity in defining a "particular social group,"
discussing the points of consensus that have emerged, and setting forth the two
major approaches to defining this term).
3. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds,
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Ward v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1993] 2
S.C.R. 689, 736-39; G.J., No. 1312/93, (Refugee Status App. Auth. Aug. 30, 1995)
(N.Z.); Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (ap-
peal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); see also MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFU-
GEE LAW AND SocIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 300 (2007); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Pro-
tected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of
"Membership of a Particular Social Group," in UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTA-
TIONS, supra note 2, at 294; Hathaway & Foster, supra note 2.
4. See supra note 3. Most civil law jurisdictions have not developed the "particular
social group" ground at all. See FOSTER, supra note 3, at 295 n.17.
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Australia, on the other hand, has emphaszied social perceptions, while also tak-
ing immutable characteristics into account.'
In 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
issued guidelines that present the "protected characteristic" and "social percep-
tion" approaches as alternative ways of establishing a particular social group,
instructing States Parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention (the "Convention") to
determine first if there is a protected characteristic and, only if no such charac-
teristic exists, to determine whether the group is recognized by society.6 Two
recent decisions by the BIA, C-A- and A-M-E-, purported to rely on the
UNHCR guidelines when emphasizing the importance of "social visibility" in
defining a particular social group! The BIA's interpretation of "social visibility"
in C-A-, however, diverged from the international community's understanding
of the "social perception" approach, as it focused on the visibility of group
members rather than whether the group as a whole was recognized by society,
and stressed a subjective rather than an objective standard.8 Furthermore, in A-
M-E-, the BIA failed to follow the sequential steps set forth by the UNHCR,
suggesting in an ambiguous and internally inconsistent decision that the "pro-
tected characteristic" and "social visibility" tests may now represent dual re-
quirements in all social group cases. 9 Read together, these cases represent a sig-
nificant departure from precedent. The BIA's new emphasis on "social visi-
bility" undermines the principled framework for analyzing social group claims
set forth in Acosta and will lead to incoherent, inconsistent decisions that have
no basis in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (the "Protocol").
Part I of this Article sets forth the "protected characteristic" and "social
perception" approaches, showing how the former has a foundation in law while
the latter does not. I then discuss the BIA's new "social visibility" test against
5. See, e.g., Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190
C.L.R. 225 (Austl.). Chief Judge Gleeson's opinion in Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 1, 14 (Austl.), which reasoned
that "women in any society" comprise a particular social group, comports with
both the protected characteristic and social perception approaches. Some com-
mentators also support the social perception approach. See, e.g., Guy GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (1996); Aleinikoff, supra note 3,
at 294-301.
6. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on International Protec-
tion: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article IA(2)
of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/o2/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines on
Membership of a Particular Social Group].
7- A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), affd, Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d
70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007); C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 20o6), affd, Castillo-
Arias v. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 19o (ith Cir. 2006). The BIA designated C-A- as
precedent after the fact, without open consideration or argument.
8. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 955-61; see also infra Part I.
9. See A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73-75; see also infra Part I.
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this background, explaining how it diverges from domestic and international
decisions. In Part II, I argue that adjudicators in the United States should not
give deference to the BIA's decisions in C-A- and A-M-E- because they do not
provide a permissible interpretation of the Convention and represent a sudden,
unexplained change in the way the BIA defines "membership of a particular so-
cial group."'" In Part III, I turn from the legal reasons for rejecting the "social
visibility" test to the practical challenges involved in applying this approach,
drawing on studies in the fields of cognitive science and psychology to show
that public perception is highly context-dependent and inherently difficult to
pin down. This Part also discusses the difficult evidentiary issues that will con-
front adjudicators when determining the perceptions of a foreign society.
Part IV highlights how the "social visibility" test may have a profound,
negative impact on asylum cases related to sexual orientation and gender, where
not only the harm is hidden in the private sphere, but the group members
themselves may be veiled from sight. With respect to sexual orientation, the
United States and international authorities have rejected the notion that gays
and lesbians who remain "discreet"-and therefore "invisible"-are not pro-
tected by the refugee definition." Under the "social visibility" test, however,
their claims may well be denied. Indeed, even claims brought by "out" gays and
lesbians may be rejected if they come from societies that do not recognize ho-
mosexuals as a group or homosexuality as a social identity.
In addition, the "social visibility" test poses a new twist in the pub-
lic/private distinction that has long pervaded the debate around gender-based
asylum. Initially, gender-related forms of harm, such as sexual violence, do-
mestic abuse, female genital cutting, and honor killings were dismissed as "pri-
10. At the time of writing, the BIA issued two more decisions that clearly emphasize
the importance of social visibility in defining a particular social group: S-E-G-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 20o8) (finding that "Salvadoran youths who have
resisted gang recruitment, or family members of such Salvadoran youth" do not
satisfy the social visibility test and do not constitute particular social groups), and
E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2oo8) ("[T]he particular social group iden-
tified by the Immigration Judge as 'persons resistant to gang membership' lacks
the social visibility that would allow others to identify its members as part of such
a group."); see also A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (B.I.A. 2008) ("[W]e are doubt-
ful that young Bambara women who oppose arranged marriage have the kind of
social visibility that would make them readily identifiable to those who would be
inclined to persecute them."). These decisions rely on the reasoning set forth in C-
A- and A-M-E-. See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586-88; E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at
594-96; A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 303.
ll. See, e.g., Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F. 3d 1163, 1172 (9 th Cir. 2005) (noting that "all
alien homosexuals are members of a 'particular social group"'); Appellant
S3 9 5 /2002 v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 C.L.R.
473 (Austl.) (same); No. 74665/03 (Refugee Status App. Auth. July 7, 2004) (N.Z.),
available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF-2004o7o7_74665.pdf
(finding that a gay man from Iran who is "discreet" and unknown to the authori-
ties satisfies the definition of a refugee).
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vate matters" that did not constitute persecution. 2 In the same way that "pri-
vate" harm was discounted, so, too, was harm perpetuated by private indi-
viduals (i.e., non-state actors), such as family members.'3 While most countries
now recognize that "private" harm can constitute persecution and that non-
state actors can perpetrate harm where the state fails to provide protection, asy-
lum cases brought by women still raise complex questions.' 4 The new "social
visibility" requirement raises the specter of the private/public distinction by re-
quiring members of a particular social group to have a public face. Thus, it may
well result in the denial of asylum claims brought by some of the most vulner-
able individuals, notwithstanding the existence of a "protected characteristic."
Finally, I conclude that adjudicators should reject the "social visibility" ap-
proach because it destroys Acosta's principled framework, represents an abdica-
tion of U.S. obligations under the 1967 Protocol, cannot be applied in a consis-
tent way, and ignores the complex relationship between visibility and power.
I. FOUR APPROACHES TO DEFINING MEMBERSHIP OF A "PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP"
A. The "Protected Characteristic" Approach
The BIA set forth the seminal definition of a "particular social group" in
Acosta, which required that group members have a "common immutable char-
acteristic" that they "either cannot change, or should not be required to change
12. Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the "Domestic"
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 391 (2001)
("Forms of harm that are unique to or disproportionately affect women ... are no
longer routinely dismissed as 'private.' Instead, they are accepted as core human
rights violations included within the concept of persecution."); Andrea Binder,
Gender and the "Membership in a Particular Social Group" Category of the 1951
Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 172-75 (2001) (discussing
various types of gender-specific persecution).
13. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 12, at 392.
14. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 12, at 393-94 (discussing the complex questions of in-
terpretation that arise in non-state actor asylum cases); Alice Edwards, Age and
Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law, in UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSUL-
TATIONS, supra note 2, at 59 ("Whether persecution, within the context of the 1951
Convention definition, can be derived from non-State actors or agents, as op-
posed to State agents, has been at the forefront of debate on international refugee
law."); Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State
Actor: The Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 788
(2003) ("The non-state actor, particularly because of his myriad shapes, presents
unique analytical challenges to asylum law."); Daniel Wilsher, Non-State Actors
and the Definition of a Refugee in the United Kingdom: Protection, Accountability or
Culpability?, 15 INT'L I. REFUGEE L. 68 (2003) (arguing that the degree to which
the 1951 Convention protects victims of persecution by non-state actors is contro-
versial).
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because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences."' 5 In ar-
riving at this formative definition, the BIA relied on traditional methods of
statutory interpretation. Specifically, the BIA applied "the well-established doc-
trine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally, 'of the same kind,"' to the five pro-
tected grounds in the refugee definition.'6 This doctrine helps give meaning to
groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear. As
the BIA explained, ejusdem generis "holds that general words used in an enu-
meration with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with
the specific words.' 1 7 In the refugee definition, the general term "membership
of a particular social group" appears alongside the more specific words "race,"
"religion," "nationality," and "political opinion."'8 Since each of the more spe-
cific words describes "an immutable characteristic," that is, "a characteristic
that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental
to individual identity or conscience that it ought not to be required to be
changed," the BIA defined "membership of a particular social group" in the
same way.' 9 By way of example, the BIA stated that "[t]he shared characteristic
might be an innate one, such as sex, color or kinship ties, or in some circum-
stances, it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership
or land ownership."" °
Applying the ejusdem generis doctrine to defining "membership of a par-
ticular social group" not only engages in a serious textual analysis of the Con-
vention and its Protocol, but also respects "the specific situation known to the
drafters-concern for the plight of persons whose social origins put them at
comparable risk to those in the other enumerated categories," as well as "the
more general commitment to grounding refugee claims in civil or political
status." In addition, the Acosta standard "is sufficiently open-ended to allow
for evolution in much the same way as has occurred with the four other
grounds, but not so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for claims
to international protection."2 By remaining true to the text, context, and object
or purpose of the Convention, the Acosta standard comports with Article 31 of
15. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Immigration and Nationality Act § loi(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § lol(a)(42)(A)
(2000); see also 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 1.
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 11O1(A)(42)(A).
20. Id.
21. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 161 (1991).
22. Id.
27:47 2008
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the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that adju-
dicators must consider these three elements in interpreting treaties.23
The U.S. courts of appeal generally have followed Acosta in analyzing claims
based on membership of a particular social group.2 4 While there are minor dif-
ferences in the definitions of "particular social group" adopted by the Ninth
and Second Circuits, these courts also embrace Acosta and recognize that the
existence of a protected characteristic lies at the heart of the definition." Indeed,
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT] (entered into force Jan. 27, 198o). Since the VCLT postdates
the Refugee Convention, it is not strictly applicable. Id. art. 4 ("[T]he Convention
applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into force of
the present Convention."). However, the VCLT "nevertheless constitutes an au-
thoritative statement of customary public international law on the interpretation
of treaties." No.74665/o3, slip op. para. 45 (Refugee Status App. Auth. July 7, 2004)
(N.Z.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF-20040707
_74665.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2007) (according
Chevron deference to the Acosta standard and remanding to the BIA for "addi-
tional investigation or explanation with respect to the question of whether de-
fected KGB agents form a particular social group"); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d
1187, 1199 (loth Cir. 2005) (applying Acosta and finding that the female members
of the Tukulor Fulani tribe in Senegal constitute a particular social group); Mo-
hammed v. Gonzales, 40o F.3d 785, 797-98 (9 th Cir. 2005) (applying Acosta rea-
soning and holding that "Somalian females" and "young girls in the Benadiri
clan" comprise a particular social group); Castellano-Chacon v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 341 F.3d 533, 546-51 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Acosta to find
that "tattooed youth" do not comprise a particular social group); Lwin v. Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv., 144 F.3d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that
parents of Burmese student dissidents shared a common, immutable characteris-
tic sufficient to comprise a particular social group); Fatin v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Acosta in holding that
a subgroup of Iranian feminists who refuse to conform to the government's gen-
der-specific laws and norms may constitute a particular social group); Ananeh-
Firempong v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 766 F.2d 621, 626-27 (1st Cir.
1985) (applying Acosta in determining that family relations can be the basis of a
particular social group); see also Deborah Anker, Membership in a Particular Social
Group: Developments in U.S. Law, 1566 PLI/CoRP 195, 201-02 (20o6) (confirming
that a growing number of circuits, including the Second and Ninth Circuits, have
affirmed the Acosta framework).
25. In Sanchez-Trujillo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 8ol F.2d 1571, 1576 (9 th
Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit stated that "of central concern" to the existence of a
particular social group "is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship
among the purported members, which imparts some common characteristic that
is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social group." How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit subsequently clarified that "a 'particular social group' is
one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an in-
nate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its
members that members either cannot or should not be required to change it."
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the reasoning in Acosta has proven so persuasive that it has received significant
attention from foreign courts as well.2" Part of Acosta's international appeal is
its fit with fundamental norms of human rights, including non-discrimina-
tion.2 7 In Ward v. Attorney General of Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada
found that Acosta's application of ejusdem generis reflects "classic discrimina-
tion analysis. ' ' s Delving even further into the text and context of the Conven-
tion to determine its underlying principles, the Court drew on the Preamble,
which affirms the international community's commitment to upholding "the
principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms with-
out discrimination." 9 The Court then reasoned that this principle "outlines the
Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1o84, 1092-93
& n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "gay men with female sexual identities" in
Mexico constitute a particular social group). The Second Circuit, in Gomez v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 947 F.2d 66o, 664 (2d Cir. 1991), defined a
particular social group as one "comprised of individuals who possess some fun-
damental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes
of the persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general." The court,
however, modified its approach to bring it in line with Acosta in Gao v. Gonzales,
44o F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2oo6), vacated on other grounds, Keisler v. Gao, 128 S. Ct.
345 (2007); see also Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 49o F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007)
("[T]he best reading of Gomez is one that is consistent with Acosta."). For further
discussion of Gomez and its aftermath, see infra Part II.
26. While these international decisions do not have the weight of precedent in U.S.
courts, they are highly relevant because all State Parties to the Convention and its
Protocol interpret the same criteria of the refugee definition. "If one thing is clear
from the legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the en-
tire 198o [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress's primary purposes was to bring
United States refugee law into conformance with the [1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol]." Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 48o U.S. 421,
436 (1987); see also Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender and the Human Rights
Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 135 (2002) ("[R]efugee law is international
law, grounded in an international treaty.").
27. See HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 161; see also FOSTER, supra note 3, at 27 ("ex-
plor[ing] the emerging tendency to refer to human rights standards in refugee ad-
judication.").
28. Ward v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 736 (Can.); see also Veysey v.
Comm'r of the Corr. Serv., [1989] 29 F.T.R. 74 (T.D.) (Fed. Ct.) (Can.) (applying
the ejusdem generis rule to define the scope of non-enumerated prohibited
grounds for discrimination and concluding that sexual orientation is one such
ground because it "has the attribute of immutability" and because individuals
"have been victimized and stigmatized throughout history" on this basis).
29. [1993] Ward, 2 S.C.R. at 733 (quoting 1951 Convention, pmbl.). As previously
noted, the VCLT requires the text to be interpreted according to its ordinary
meaning in context. The permissible sources set forth in Article 31(2) of the VCLT
for examining the context of a treaty include the Preamble. The European Court
of Human Rights has also emphasized that "the [P]reamble is generally very use-
ful for the determination of the 'object' and 'purpose' of the instrument to be
27:47 2008
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boundaries of the objectives sought to be achieved and consented to by the
delegates ... and thereby provides an inherent limit to the cases embraced by
the Convention."3 Accordingly, "[t]he manner in which groups are distin-
guished for the purposes of discrimination law can ... appropriately be im-
ported into this area of refugee law."3' Based on this reasoning, Ward identified
three possible categories that could constitute particular social groups: "(1)
groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; (2) groups whose
members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dig-
nity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and (3) groups
associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical perma-
nence."
32
Ward's approach adopts the formulation set forth by James C. Hathaway in
his classic text, The Law of Refugee Status, which states that "[tihe dominant
view.., is that refugee law ought to concern itself with actions which deny
human dignity in any key way ..... 3 Since the Convention has its roots in the
modern human rights movement, it constitutes part of the wider corpus of in-
ternational human rights law.34 Numerous other refugee scholars have also en-
dorsed a human rights-based approach to interpreting the Convention, stress-
ing not only its context, but also the importance of interpreting an international
treaty as consistently and uniformly as possible. 5 In explaining the need for a
universal and objective standard, Michelle Foster writes that "[i]t could hardly
be consistent with the non-derogable nature of art. iA(2) for domestic courts to
construed." Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1975). The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has adopted a similar approach. See, e.g.,
Other Treaties Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, 1982 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1 (Sept. 24, 1982), reprinted in 3 HUM. RTS. L.J. 140
(1982); The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Con-
vention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 2 (Sept. 24, 1982), reprinted in 3 HUM. RTS. L.J. 153 (1982).
30. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 733; see also U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS para.
60 (1992) (recognizing the significance of the preamble); id. paras. 5, 17 (accepting
that human rights principles should inform the interpretation of the refugee defi-
nition).
31. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 735.
32. Id.
33. HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 1o8.
34. See FOSTER, supra note 3, at 49-50.
35. For further discussion of the relationship between refugee law and international
human rights law, see FOSTER, supra note 3; Anker, supra note 12; Alice Edwards,
Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right 'To Enjoy' Asylum, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
293 (2005); James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Pro-
tection, 4 J. REFUGEE STUD. 113 (1991).
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undertake subjective and idiosyncratic interpretations, according to their own
notions of the kinds of applicants deemed worthy to receive protection under
the Refugee Convention scheme." 6 Consequently, "the human rights frame-
work for interpreting key aspects of the refugee definition" has become "the
dominant approach in refugee status determination .... -37
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, two common law countries with
well-developed jurisprudence on refugee law, have both adopted the
Ward/Acosta "protected characteristic" approach to defining a particular social
group and apply fundamental human rights norms to determine which char-
acteristics are fundamental to identity or conscience. 3' Rodger Haines, Chair-
person of New Zealand's Refugee Status Appeals Authority (the "New Zealand
Refugee Authority"), has provided detailed and principled opinions that ex-
pound on the arguments set forth above to explain why "[t]he particular social
group category is limited by anti-discrimination notions inherent in civil and
political rights. .. ."9 The New Zealand Refugee Authority specifically found
that "[t]he Acosta ejusdem generis interpretation of 'particular social group'
firmly weds the social group category to the principle of the avoidance of civil
and political discrimination." 4
In the United Kingdom, the leading case on membership in a particular so-
cial group is the House of Lords' decision in Islam, which also relied heavily on
Acosta. Islam confirmed that "the concept of discrimination in matters affecting
fundamental rights and freedoms is central to an understanding of the Conven-
tion."41 Lord Hoffman reasoned that the Convention "is concerned not with all
cases of persecution, even if they involve denials of human rights, but with per-
secution which is based on discrimination." 4 Applying this principle, the Lords
found that "women in Pakistan" constitute a particular social group based on
evidence of widespread discrimination against them.43
These decisions from Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
show how the "protected characteristic" approach set forth in Acosta has be-
36. FOSTER, supra note 3, at 36.
37. Id. at 75.
38. See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 3, at 27-31; Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 280.
39. GJ, No.1312/93 (Refugee Status App. Auth. Aug. 30, 1995), available at
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_1995o8301312.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 651 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.); (finding that "women in Pakistan" constitute a particu-
lar social group); see also Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 1
A.C. 489, 495F, 5oC, 512F, 517D (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (empha-
sizing that the principle of non-discrimination is central to the Refugee Conven-
tion).
42. Islam, [1999] 2 A.C. at 650-51.
43. Id. at 652.
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come "transnationalized." 44 While the United States may be reluctant to partici-
pate in the international dialogue among state parties, well-reasoned foreign
precedents like those discussed above can not only aid U.S. adjudicators in their
own deliberations, but also serve as a way of testing their interpretations and
analysis by "examining them in the reflection of others'." 45 Comparative law
"exposes the practices of one's own legal system as contingent and circumstan-
tial, not transcendent and timeless." 46 Mary Ann Glendon and her colleagues
have described this process as a "dialogical" mode of comparative interpreta-
tion, noting that "[clomparison often picks up issues or makes connections that
remain invisible," thereby forcing adjudicators to question their assumptions
and engage in legal self-reflection.4 7 Here, the foreign cases discussed above pro-
vide a deeper understanding of Acosta's "protected characteristic" approach by
grounding it more firmly in the text, context, and purpose of the Convention. 4
44. As Deborah Anker points out, "several states' administrative bodies and courts
engage in a productive dialoge with each other: by borrowing, adapting, and
building on each other's jurisprudence and instruments such as national guide-
lines, they are beginning to create a complex and rich body of 'transnationalized'
international law." Anker, supra note 26, at 136. Aleinikoff confirms that, "[t]o a
surprising degree, courts in the common law countries tend to read and analyze
cases decided in other common law States." Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 268.
45. Vicki Jackson, Comment, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 114 (2005).
46. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Com-
parative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 836 (1999).
47. MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 10 (2d ed. 1994); see also Sarah
K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409,
423-39 (2003) (exploring the potential impact of a comparative approach on a
court's perception of its role in the larger legal community and discussing the
"dialogic model" and "enforcement model" of judicial decision-making).
48. While the United States has been reluctant to participate in this international dia-
logue, there have been glimpses of hope. For example, the INS's draft regulations
on "particular social group" mention the House of Lord's decision in Islam. See
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76594 (proposed Dec. 7,
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (citing Islam). The BIA also mentioned
this decision in its vacated opinion in R-A-, if only to disavow its interpretation.
See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917-18 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated 22 I. & N. Dec. 906
(Att'y Gen. 2001), remanded for redecision, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att'y Gen. 2005).
Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court that give weight to foreign jurispru-
dence in constitutional cases will hopefully prompt adjudicators to draw on inter-
national decisions in the refugee context as well. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 577-78 (2005) (citing international covenants prohibiting the juvenile death
penalty and discussing the United Kingdom's experience in abolishing capital
punishment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (discussing the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights' decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1981), which held that laws proscribing consensual homosexual
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B. The "Social Perception" Approach
Unlike the "protected characteristic" approach, which is based on the doc-
trine of ejusdem generis and anti-discrimination principles, the "social percep-
tion" approach is based loosely on "sociological methodology." 49 Of the com-
mon law countries, only Australia has emphasized social perception in
analyzing claims based on membership of a protected social group. In Applicant
A v. Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the High Court of Australia
found that the defining characteristics of a particular social group are a com-
mon attribute and a societal perception that the group is set apart from other
members of society." In Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration and Multicul-
tural Affairs, however, the High Court clarified that while social perception may
be relevant to determining whether a "particular social group" exists, it is not a
requirement." The High Court explained that the "general principle is not that
the group must be recognised or perceived within the society, but rather that
the group must be distinguished from the rest of the society" examining whether
conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights). In
Roper, the Court found it "proper" to "acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion," noting that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while
not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation
of our own conclusions." 543 U.S. at 578; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Interna-
tional Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45 (2004) (arguing that the
U.S. Supreme Court has historically looked to foreign jurisdictions for aid in in-
terpretation in at least three situations, one of which is where there are "parallel
rules," in other words, "when American legal rules seem to parallel those of other
nations, particularly those with similar legal and social traditions"). The United
States, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Australia are all common
law countries interpreting the same definition of a "refugee" in their asylum cases.
It is therefore particularly appropriate for U.S. courts to look to decisions from
these countries in interpreting the refugee definition.
49. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 2, at 486; Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 272 (describ-
ing the Australian High Court's social perception approach as "sociological," be-
cause it "is not based on an analogy to anti-discrimination principles," but rather
"looks to external factors-namely, whether the group is perceived as distinct in
society").
5o. See Applicant A v. Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 19o C.L.R. 225,
241 (Dawson, J.), 265-66 (McHugh, J.) (holding that married couples who fear
forced sterilization due to their opposition to China's "one-child policy" do not
comprise a particular social group).
51. Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 C.L.R.
387, 393 (finding that the lower court had erred in requiring there to be evidence
that Afghan society perceived young, able-bodied men to comprise a particular
social group).
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the society in question perceives there to be such a group" is just "[o] ne way" to
make this determination.52
The High Court found that cultural, social, religious, and legal norms may
also reflect whether a group is set apart and that adjudicators can assess such
norms from an objective third-party perspective. In rejecting a purely subjective
approach, the High Court reasoned:
Communities may deny the existence of particular social groups be-
cause the common attribute shared by members of the group offends
religious or cultural beliefs held by a majority of the community. Those
communities do not recognize or perceive the existence of the particu-
lar social group, but it cannot be said that the particular social group
does not exist.53
In addition to recognizing that subjective perceptions may, at times, be unreli-
able indications of whether a particular social group exists, the High Court
found that requiring a society to perceive the group as being set apart would
impose a criterion that had no basis in the 1951 Convention.5 4 Thus, while the
court did not engage in the same type of principled statutory interpretation
found in Acosta, Ward, and Islam, it nevertheless attempted to avoid an ap-
proach that would be wholly unsupported by the Convention's text, context, or
purpose.55 Judge McHugh summarized the court's conclusion as follows: "To
qualify as a particular social group, it is enough that objectively there is an iden-
tifiable group of persons with a social presence in the country, set apart from
other members of that society, and united by a common characteristic, attrib-
ute, activity, belief, interest, goal, aim or principle." 6
The court's conclusion in Applicant S is consistent with the UNHCR's un-
derstanding of the social perception approach. According to the UNHCR,
"[t]he question to be established is whether the particular social group is 'cog-
nisable' as a group, viewed objectively in terms of the relevant society."57 The
52. Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added); see also id. at 408 (McHugh, J.) (expounding on
the distinction between an objective and subjective analysis, and stressing that the
requirement that a group be "cognisable" within a society by no means requires
that the society recognizes the group as set apart).
53. Id. at 400 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 410 (McHugh, J.) ("[T]hose who form
the 'particular social group' may be perceived by the society in which the group
exists as aberrant individuals and may even be described by a particular name, yet
the society may not perceive these individuals as constituting a particular social
group. Nevertheless, those living outside that society may easily recognise the in-
dividuals concerned as comprising a particular social group.").
54. Id. at 410 (McHugh, J.); id. at 421-22 (Callinan, J.).
55. See also Applicant A, 19o C.L.R. at 264 (McHugh, J.) (stating that what may be
critical "in most, perhaps all, cases" is "external perceptions of the group").
56. Applicant S, 217 C.L.R. at 410-11.
57. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCRI, UNHCR Annotated Comments on
the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for
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UNHCR has stressed that a group "may be cognizable 'objectively' having regard
to the circumstances considered by a Court," and "[ilt may be seen to be 'set
apart' for cultural, social, religious or legal factors." 8 In Secretary of State for the
Home Department v. K (FC), the House of Lords accepted the UNHCR's and
High Court's interpretation of the social perception approach. 9 Lord Hope
stated that it would be "a mistake to say that a particular social group does not
exist unless it is always perceived as such by the society in which it exists," find-
ing it "sufficient that the asylum-seeker can be seen objectively to have been sin-
gled out by the persecutor or persecutors for reasons of his or her membership
of a particular social group whose defining characteristics exist independently of
the words or actions of the persecutor."60
C. The UNHCR Guidelines on Membership in a Particular Social Group
In 2002, the UNHCR issued Guidelines on Membership of a Particular So-
cial Group (the "Guidelines") that updated its Handbook and, like the Hand-
book, provide legal "interpretive guidance for governments, legal practitioners
and decision-makers, including the judiciary."'" These Guidelines represent an
outcome of the Global Consultations on the International Protection of Refu-
the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refu-
gees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of
the Protection Granted (OI L 304/12 of 3o.9.2004), Comment on art. lo(d), at 23 (Jan.
28, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42ood8354.html
("The 'social perception approach' is based on a common characteristic which
creates a cognizable group that sets it apart from the society at large.") (emphasis
added); Brief for U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Claimants at 8, Thomas, No. A75-597-0331-o34/-035/-036 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter UNHCR Brief in Thomas] (unpublished brief and decision on file
with the Yale Law & Policy Review) ("[M]embers of a group need not be easily
recognizable to the general public in order for the group as a whole to be per-
ceived by society as a particular social group.").
58. UNHCR Brief in Thomas, supra note 57, at 7 (internal citations omitted).
59. [20o6] 1 A.C. 412, 445 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales) (Lord Hope) (internal
citations omitted).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 6
para. 1. The UNHCR issued the Guidelines pursuant to its mandate, particularly
its supervisory role set forth in paragraph 8 of the UNHCR Statute, together with
Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article II of the 1967 Protocol. In
addition, the Agenda for Protection, endorsed by the Executive Committee and
welcomed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, specifically instructed
the UNHCR to produce such complementary guidelines to its Handbook. See
U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., at goal i, obj. 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/ 965/Add.1 (June 26,
2002).
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gees, which the UNHCR launched in 2000.62 As part of the "second track" of
the Global Consultations, which explored different interpretations of certain
elements of the Convention an expert round table convened in San Remo in
September 2001 to address the topic of membership of a particular social
group.6" The San Remo seminar "enjoyed broad participation by governments,
the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, other legal practitioners,
non-governmental organizations and academia .... "64 The purpose of the
meeting "was to take stock of the state of the law and practice in these areas, to
consolidate the various positions taken and to develop concrete recommenda-
tions to achieve more consistent understandings of these various interpretive
issues."6
Noting that the "protected characteristic" and "social perception" ap-
proaches represent the two main approaches to interpreting membership of a
particular social group, the Guidelines sought to reconcile them by "adopt[ing]
a single standard" that incorporates both as alternative, sequential tests in order
to avoid "gaps" in protection.66 Specifically, the Guidelines set forth the follow-
ing definition:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are per-
ceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which
is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity,
conscience or the exercise of one's human rights.6"
Only "[iff a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic de-
termined to be neither unalterable or fundamental" should "further analysis...
be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a
cognizable group in that society."6 Thus, the Guidelines clearly indicate that
62. For information on the Global Consultations on International Protections, see the
Consultations on the UNHCR's website at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/
3b7cea164.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
63. Id.
64. UNHCR Brief in Thomas, supra note 57, at 4.
65. Id. at 4-5.
66. UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 6,
para. ii.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. para. 13 (emphasis added). In making social perception an alternative, secon-
dary test in analyzing claims based on membership of a particular social group,
the UNHCR relied on arguments made by Aleinikoff as part of the UNHCR's
Global Consultations on International Protection. See Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at
294-301 (recognizing that common law countries have developed the social group
ground primarily through the protected characteristics approach, but arguing that
a social perception approach would be more inclusive). Aleinikoff's arguments
have been rejected by scholars such as James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster,
who argue for a more principled, law-based approach and point out that "there is
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the existence of a protected characteristic is sufficient to establish a particular
social group and that the public perception approach should only be applied if
no such characteristic exists.
In K, several members of the House of Lords interpreted the European Un-
ion Refugee Qualification Directive (QD), which became effective on October
10, 2006, as consistent with these Guidelines in that it recognizes that the "pro-
tected characteristic" and "social perception" approaches are alternative tests
rather than dual requirements. 69 Lord Bingham indicated that interpreting the
QD as requiring a group to satisfy both the "protected characteristic" and "so-
cial perception" tests would make the QD "more stringent than is warranted by
international authority. '7 The BIA, on the other hand, has strayed from the
UNHCR's interpretation, as discussed below.
no clear evidence that the social perception test dependably results in the recogni-
tion of more groups than does the ejusdem generis (i.e. 'protected characteristic')
framework." Hathaway & Foster, supra note 2, at 488 (alteration in original).
Rodger Haines, on the other hand, has criticized the social perception approach as
"enlarg[ing] the social group category to an almost meaningless degree." See
RODGER HAINES, INTERIM REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP (1998), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/Reference/
Iarljpaper.htm.
69. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. K, 1 A.C. 412, 432 (appeal taken from Eng. &
Wales) (Lord Bingham); id. para. 46 (Lord Hope); id. para. 118 (Lord Brown). The
UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (UKAIT), a lower level tribunal, however,
has recently taken a different view. See SB [2008] UKAIT 00002 paras. 69, 73-74,
available at http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/Upload/j2o87/oooo2_ukait_2o8_sb
_moldova-cg.doc (finding that Article io.i(d) of the Qualification Directive, and
regulation 6(i)(d), which implements it, do present dual requirements and that
"the observations of their Lordships [in K] were obiter, although very persuasive,
because it is clear that their Lordships did not decide the cases under regulation
6(i)(d) or Article io.i(d) of the Qualification Directive"). The Qualification Direc-
tive outlines the minimum standards for qualifying third country nationals and
stateless persons as refugees or persons otherwise in need of international protec-
tion. Article io.i(d) of the QD provides:
(d) [A] group shall be considered to form a particular social group where
in particular:
members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common
background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or be-
lief that is so fundamental to their identity or conscience that a per-
son should not be forced to renounce it; and
that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it
is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
Council Directive 2004/83/EC, On Minimum Standards for the Qualification and
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons
Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection
Granted, art. lo(d), 2004 O.J. (L 304/12) (emphasis added).
70. K, [2006] 1 A.C. at 432 (Lord Bingham). The interpretation of Lords Bingham,
Hope, and Brown is consistent with the UNHCR's comments on the Qualification
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D. The BIA's New "Social Visibility" Test
Although the BIA has relied on Acosta's "protected characteristic" approach
for over two decades as virtually the sole method for determining whether a
particular social group exists, its recent decisions in C-A- and A-M-E- empha-
size the additional importance of "social visibility." Prior to these decisions, nei-
ther the BIA nor the federal courts mentioned "social visibility" as relevant to
the particular social group analysis, yet the BIA did not acknowledge any de-
parture from precedent. Moreover, although the BIA referenced the UNHCR
Guidelines in both C-A- and A-M-E-, its use of "social visibility" did not coin-
cide with the "public perception" approach described above; nor did the BIA
apply the UNHCR's approach correctly.
i. The C-A- Case
In C-A-, the BIA found that a group defined as "noncriminal drug infor-
mants working against the Cali drug cartel" did not constitute a particular so-
cial group because of "the voluntary nature of the decision to serve as a gov-
ernment informant, the lack of social visibility of the members of the purported
social group, and the indications in the record that the Cali cartel retaliates
against anyone perceived to have interfered with its operations."' 7' After "re-
view[ing] the range of approaches to defining particular social group," includ-
ing the UNHCR Guidelines, the BIA asserted that it would "continue to adhere
to the Acosta formulation," but added that it would "consider[] as a relevant
factor the extent to which members of a society perceive those with the charac-
teristic in question as members of a social group."72 The BIA first analyzed
whether the proposed social group had an "immutable characteristic" and,
finding that it did not, turned to the issue of "visibility." 73
In rejecting the group of confidential informants as socially visible, the BIA
reasoned that "the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally out
of the public view."74 The BIA stressed that "informant[s] against the Cali cartel
intend [] to remain unknown and undiscovered," and "[ r] ecognizability or visi-
bility is limited to those informants who are discovered because they appear as
Directive, which highlight the potential "gap" in protection that may emerge if
both the "protected characteristic" and "social perception" tests must be satisfied
to meet the definition of a particular social group. UNHCR, Annotated Comments
on the EC Council Directive, supra note 57, comment on Article lo(d) (emphasis
added).
71. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A.), affd, Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446
F.3d 119o (uth Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 956-57 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 958-59.
74. Id. at 96o (emphasis added).
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witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel members." 75 The BIA's
analysis in C-A- suggests that under the "social visibility" test, the group mem-
bers must be recognizable by the general public; it is not enough for the group
itself to be recognized. Moreover, C-A- seems to indicate that the visibility of
some group members is not sufficient to satisfy the "social visibility" test. By fo-
cusing on the visibility of group members and examining only the subjective per-
ceptions of the relevant society to determine whether a group is recognizable,
the BIA's "social visibility" test departs from the "social perception" approach
set forth above. Thus, although the BIA referenced the UNHCR Guidelines, it
did not truly apply the "social perception" approach set forth therein.
In placing so much emphasis on "social visibility," the BIA never acknowl-
edged a departure from precedent. On the contrary, it justified the "social visi-
bility" test by asserting that its "decisions involving social groups have consid-
ered the recognizability, i.e., the social visibility, of the group in question."
76
After noting that "[s]ocial groups based on innate characteristics such as sex or
family relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others
to constitute social groups," the BIA cited several cases that it decided under the
Acosta standard.7 For example, the BIA reasoned that in considering clan mem-
bership in H-, it "did not rule categorically that membership in any clan would
suffice" but "examined the extent to which members of the purported group
would be recognizable to others in Somalia." 8 The BIA went on to state that its
"other decisions recognizing particular social groups involved characteristics
that were highly visible and recognizable by others in the country in question,"
citing cases involving "Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry," 79 "young
women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of northern Togo who did not undergo
female genital mutilation as practiced by that tribe and who opposed the prac-
tice,"" "persons listed by the [Cuban] government as having the status of a ho-
mosexual,"'" and "former members of the national police" of El Salvador.2
All of these decisions turned on an Acosta analysis based on immutable
characteristics, not social perception or visibility. For example, in Kasinga, the
BIA found that "[t]he characteristics of being a 'young woman' and a 'member
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe' cannot be changed" and that "[t]he character-
75. Id. Insofar as the respondent relied on the distinction between informants who
"act out of a sense of civic responsibility" and those who act for compensation,
the BIA found that this distinction "would also tie group membership to a factor
not 'visible' to the Cali cartel or to other members of society." Id.
76. Id. at 959.
77. Id. at 959-60.
78. Id. at 959 (citing H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996)).
79. Id. at 960 (citing V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997)).
80. Id. at 955 (citing Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996)).
81. Id. at 960 (citing Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 199o)).
82. Id. (citing Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988)).
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istic of having intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual
identity of a young woman that she should not be required to change it."8" Like-
wise, the homosexual status at issue in Toboso-Alfonso is an immutable charac-
teristic that either cannot be changed or that one should not have to change; the
characteristic of being of mixed race at issue in V-T-S- cannot be changed; and
the past experience of belonging to the national police at issue in Fuentes is im-
mutable. The mere fact that these groups may be recognizable does not support
the BIA's suggestion that it has always examined social visibility or social per-
ception in analyzing claims based on membership of a particular social group.
Furthermore, it seems doubtful that all of the cases cited by the BIA actually
involved "highly visible" traits.8 4 Even if one were to accept that the groups in
question are recognized by the relevant societies, one would be hard-pressed to
argue that the members of these groups are socially visible, as required by C-A-.
The BIA's decision in Kasinga, for example, contains no information indicating
that young women who oppose female genital cutting are publicly vocal about
their opinion, or that anyone outside their families has reason to know whether
or not they have undergone the practice."a In an amicus brief challenging the
use of "social visibility" in defining a particular social group, the UNHCR
points out that "the general population of Cuba would not recognize homo-
sexuals, nor would average Salvadorans necessarily recognize former members
of the national police, nor would a typical Togolese tribal member inevitably be
aware of women who opposed female genital mutilation but had not been sub-
jected to the practice."86
2. The A-M-E- Case
just seven months after deciding C-A-, the BIA issued its decision in A-M-
E-, which placed even greater emphasis on "social visibility."8 7 The Second Cir-
cuit remanded this case for the BIA to "'expand upon' Acosta... as to the
meaning of 'particular social group' and to explain why 'affluent Guatemalans'
are not a 'particular social group."'88 Although the BIA began its analysis in A-
M-E- by stating the Acosta standard, it never actually conducted a thorough
analysis under Acosta to determine whether the group of "wealthy Guatema-
83. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996) (emphasis added).
84. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 20o6), affd, Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
446 F.3d 119o (ith Cir. 2006).
85. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 366.
86. UNHCR Brief in Thomas, supra note 57, at 8.
87. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73-75 (B.I.A. 2007), affd, Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey,
509 F.3 d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007).
88. Id. at 73 (quoting Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 18o (2d Cir. 2006)). The
Second Circuit subsequently issued an order amending its opinion in the case.
Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2006).
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lans" has a protected characteristic. Specifically, the BIA found that wealth is a
characteristic that can be changed, but did not fully address whether it is a char-
acteristic so fundamental to identity that individuals should not be required to
change it.89 In fact, the BIA dedicated only one ambiguous sentence to this is-
sue, stating "we would not expect divestiture when considering wealth as a
characteristic on which a social group might be based." 9° While this one sen-
tence suggests that wealth might be a protected characteristic, the BIA never-
theless immediately turned to the issue of visibility and rejected the proposed
group on that basis.9' In so doing, the BIA failed to apply the approach set forth
in the UNHCR Guidelines, which explicitly provides that social perception
should be considered only if there is no protected characteristic. Indeed, the
BIA misconstrued the UNHCR Guidelines as generally "endors[ing] an ap-
proach in which an important factor is whether the members of the group are
'perceived as a group by society."' 92
The BIA then compounded the ambiguity of its analysis, stating that it "re-
cently affirmed the importance of social visibility as a factor in the particular so-
cial group determination in C-A-," but in the very next sentence referring to
"the requirement that the shared characteristic of the group should generally be
recognizable by others in the community."93 Thus, A-M-E- is internally incon-
sistent about whether social visibility is a factor or a requirement. From this
point of confusion, the BIA began its analysis of whether the group of "wealthy
Guatemalans" is socially visible. Finding "little" evidence that "wealthy Guate-
malans would be recognized as a group that is at a greater risk of crime in gen-
eral or of extortion or robbery in particular," since the reports indicated that
89. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73.
90. Id. Given the dispute among refugee scholars as to whether a privileged social
class can constitute a protected characteristic, the BIA should have engaged this
complex issue, instead of avoiding it by basing its decision on "social visibility."
See FOSTER, supra note 3 (arguing generally that the Refugee Convention is capa-
ble of accommodating claims based on the deprivation of economic and social
rights); Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV.
450, 461 (1985) (arguing that "the poor as a class... may constitute a persecuted
'social group' when the economic conditions underlying their poverty are attrib-
utable to the exercise or maintenance of political power"). Compare HATHAWAY,
supra note 21, at 166 ("[T]he members of a privileged social class who resist re-
nunciation of economic privilege are not protected, since it is within their ability
voluntarily to renounce their property, an interest which is not protected under
core human rights norms."), with T. Le & M. Esser, The Vietnamese Refugee and
U.S. Law, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 656, 664-65 (1981) (arguing that the Viet-
namese "who left as a result of government action (such as the creation of 'New
Economic Zones' or the promulgation of decrees eliminating private ownership)"
qualify within the social group category).
91. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73.
92. Id. at 74.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
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crime is "pervasive at all social-economic levels," the BIA concluded that it had
"no reason to believe that the general societal perception would be otherwise." 94
The BIA also noted that "[f]rom the point of view of a criminal bent on extor-
tion, persons with relatively modest resources or income [might still be] . . . po-
tential targets." 95 For these reasons, the Board found that the proposed group of
wealthy Guatemalans "fails the 'social visibility' test."96
While ambiguous and internally inconsistent, the BIA's decision in A-M-E-
strongly suggests that the BIA is now applying the traditional "protected char-
acteristic" test and its new "social visibility" test (which, as previously noted,
differs from the international community's understanding of the "social per-
ception" approach) as dual requirements instead of alternative tests.97 In fact, a
recent decision by the Ninth Circuit found that, under A-M-E-, "a shared char-
acteristic of a group must generally be recognizable to others" and specifically
referred to "the BIA's requirement of social visibility." ' However, even if the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. In addition, the BIA held that the proposed group "fails the particularity re-
quirement of the refugee definition," finding that "[t]he terms 'wealthy' and 'af-
fluent' standing alone are too amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for
determining group membership." Id. at 76.
97. The BIA's decision in Thomas, No. A75- 597-o331-o34/-o351-o36 (B.I.A. Dec. 27,
2007) supports this interpretation of A-M-E-. Thomas was remanded by the Ninth
Circuit for consideration of whether the specific family involved ("Boss Ronnie's
family") constitutes a particular social group, pursuant to the Supreme Court's
decision in Gonzalez v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) ("The agency has not yet
considered whether [petitioner's] family presents the kind of 'kinship ties' that
constitute a 'particular social group.' The matter requires determining the facts
and deciding whether the facts as found fall within a statutory term."). In Thomas,
the BIA found:
Not all groups that have an immutable or fundamental characteristic will
be considered particular social groups for purposes of asylum. As we ex-
plained in C-A-, supra, the group must also have a distinct, recognizable
identity in the particular country at issue... The group must be per-
ceived as being different from other groups or from society at large ....
Thomas, No. A75-597-o331-o34/-o35/-o36, slip op. 6.
98. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (finding that
"tattooed gang members" do not constitute a particular social group). In Arteaga
the petitioner argued that his tattoos made him visible to the police and other
gang members as a gang member. In rejecting the proposed social groups, the
court reasoned that it did not "believe that the BIA's requirement of social visibil-
ity intended to include members or former members of violent street gangs under
the definition of 'particular social group' merely because they could be readily
identifiable." Id.; see also, Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 746 (9 th Cir.
20o8) (finding that young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence "fails to
qualify as a particular social group because it lacks social visibility").
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BIA is applying "social visibility" as an important factor in all social group cases,
rather than a requirement, it still represents a sudden, significant departure
from Acosta and other precedents, not to mention international authorities.
II. "SOcIAL VISIBILITY" AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE BIA's IN-
TERPRETATION OF A "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP"
Since the BIA's decisions in C-A- and A-M-E- represent sudden, unex-
plained and incoherent departures from precedents-particularly Acosta-the
federal courts should not defer to these decisions insofar as they emphasize "so-
cial visibility" when interpreting the meaning of "membership of a particular
social group." 99 Chevron deference does not apply when an agency's interpreta-
tion of a statutory term conflicts with positions that the agency has taken in the
past.1"' Moreover, the BIA's failure to offer any reasonable explanation for its
new interpretation distinguishes the situation at hand from cases where courts
have granted substantial deference despite a revised agency interpretation be-
cause of a "well-considered basis for the change.....
The Second Circuit's decision in Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, which granted
Chevron deference to A-M-E- after remanding the case to the BIA for a pub-
lished decision, is unpersuasive for several reasons.0 2 First, the court reasoned
that "C-A-'s social visibility requirement is consistent with" the reasoning of
99. The principles of deference under the rule of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), apply to the statutory scheme of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503. See Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (stating that the BIA,
which is vested with the Attorney General's discretion and authority in cases be-
fore it, "should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory
terms 'concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication') (quot-
ing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49
(1987)). Chevron provides that when "the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue," the reviewing court should ask "whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. at 843.
loo. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (finding that an "[u]nexplained inconsistency is ... a reason for holding an
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice");
Lal v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 255 F.3d 998, loo6-07 (9th Cir. 20O1), as
amended on reh'g, 268 F. 3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the BIA's interpreta-
tion of its own regulation should be overturned because the BIA committed an
"arbitrary and capricious act" by suddenly changing its interpretation). But see
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007) (granting Chevron
deference to A-M-E- based on its finding that the BIA's construction of "mem-
bership of a particular social group" was a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute).
1oi. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens' Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989).
102. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73.
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Gomez v. INS, which provided that a "'particular social group is comprised of
individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which
serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the out-
side world in general.".. 3 The court did not recognize the key differences be-
tween Gomez's approach, which resembles the international community's un-
derstanding of the "social perception" approach, and the BIA's new "social
visibility" test. Like the Australian High Court's decision in Applicant S, Gomez
indicated that a group may be distinguished from society based on an objective,
third-party perspective ("the outside world in general") and that recognition by
the persecutor is sufficient.0 4 Furthermore, unlike C-A-, Gomez did not focus
on whether group members were visible. Finally, while Gomez mentioned the
relevance of external perception and distinguishing the group from society at
large, it did not require social perception, much less social visibility, as integral
to the particular social group analysis. Gomez therefore fails to justify or explain
"C-A-'s social visibility requirement."'0 5
Second, Ucelo-Gomez ignored how Gomez was seriously criticized by other
circuits and significantly limited, if not repudiated, by the Second Circuit itself
in Gao v. Gonzales because the decision "could (and has) been read as conflict-
ing with Acosta." '' °6 In A-M-E-, the BIA acknowledged in a footnote that Gao
limited the relevant language in Gomez, but nevertheless relied on Gomez be-
cause it represented the law "at the time of the Immigration Judge's decision
103. Id. (quoting Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d
Cir. 1991)). In Gomez, the court held that "women who have been previously bat-
tered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas" do not constitute a particular social
group, reasoning that "broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender
will not by itself [sic] endow individuals with membership in a particular group."
947 F.2d at 663-64.
104. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
105. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73.
1O6. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F. 3 d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that women sold into
marriage in a certain area of China belong to a "particular social group"), vacated
on other grounds, Keisler v. Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007). In Gao, the Second Circuit
found that "Gomez can reasonably be read as limited to situations in which an ap-
plicant fails to show a risk of future persecution on the basis of the 'particular so-
cial group' claimed, rather than as setting an a priori rule for which social groups
are cognizable." Id. at 69. The court reasoned that this reading of Gomez "would
appear to conform better to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of [the refugee
definition] in Acosta and the consensus among the other circuits." Id. at 69-70.
Prior to Gao, Gomez was criticized in Lwin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that Gomez was "useful in pointing out the
significance of external perceptions of a group," but "offer[ed] little guidance in
the way of a positive definition of the term 'social group"'); and Niang v. Gonzales,
422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (loth Cir. 2005) (finding that Gomez failed to take Acosta into
account).
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and [the BIA's] summary affirmance.' ' 07 Insofar as the BIA's decisions in C-A-
and A-M-E- may suggest that the BIA adopted Gomez's "recognizable and dis-
crete" requirement in precedents such as H-, this argument is unconvincing be-
cause that standard has only been mentioned sporadically by the BIA. While H-
notes that tribal affiliations are "highly visible" and cites the standard in Gomez,
neither perception nor visibility was integral to the BIA's conclusion, which
stressed that "the Marehan share ties of kinship" and "are identifiable as a
group based upon linguistic commonalities," confirming that it relied on im-
mutable kinship and linguistic ties.1° s Just two weeks after deciding H-, the BIA
issued its decision in Kasinga, where the social group was defined, in part, based
on tribal affiliation, yet the BIA never mentioned Gomez or visibility in its brief
analysis of the "particular social group," which focused solely on the immutable
characteristics of gender, age, and "having intact genitalia."' 0 9 Reading H- and
Kasinga together, it is clear that the BIA never adopted the standard in Gomez,
much less a social visibility test, prior to C-A-.
Last but not least, the court in Ucelo-Gomez found the BIA's "social visibil-
ity" test to be reasonable because it "relied heavily" on the UNHCR Guide-
lines." As discussed above, however, the BIA's approach in A-M-E- clearly con-
tradicts the UNHCR Guidelines by failing to follow the proper sequential
analysis, and the BIA's interpretation of "social visibility" differs from the
UNHCR's (and the international community's) understanding of "social per-
ception." Thus, the BIA's new approach not only diverges from domestic
precedents and international decisions, but also contradicts the views of the
preeminent authority on the interpretation of refugee law. As a State Party to
the 1967 Protocol, the United States is obliged to "co-operate with the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ... in the exercise of its
functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application
of the provisions of the present Protocol.""' By misconstruing and misapplying
the UNHCR's approach to analyzing social group claims, the United States
shirks its responsibilities under the Protocol. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has long held that courts must construe statutes in a manner consistent
with the United States's international obligations whenever possible.' 2 The
107. A-M-E-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, n.7 (B.I.A. 2007).
lO8. H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342-43 (B.I.A. 1996).
1o9. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996).
11o. Ucelo-Gomez, 5o9 F.3d at 73.
111. 1967 Protocol, supra note i, at art. II, para. 1; see also 1951 Convention, supra note 1,
art. 35, para. 1.
112. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (i Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[A] n Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains .... ); Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 48o U.S. 421, 432-33 (1987) (finding "abundant evi-
dence" that Congress intended to conform the definition of refugee and the asy-
lum law of the United States "to the United Nations Protocol to which the United
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BIA's construction of the statutory term "membership in a particular group" in
C-A- and A-M-E- is inconsistent with its international obligations. The federal
courts should therefore reject the BIA's "social visibility" test and interpret
"membership of a particular social group" in a manner consistent with the stat-
ute and international law.
III. THE PRACTICAL CHALLENGES OF THE "SOCIAL VISIBILITY" APPROACH
While the previous Parts explain why the BIA's new "social visibility" test is
inconsistent with domestic and international law, this Part explores why the
"social visibility" test will be inherently difficult to apply. Since this approach
seems mostly subjective and sociological in nature, not based on legal norms
and principles like the "protected characteristic" approach, it poses unique evi-
dentiary challenges and likely will result in inconsistent and incoherent deci-
sions. As Rodger Haines, Chairperson of the New Zealand's Appeals Authority,
has noted, "[a]t a practical level the state of mind of the persecutor [or society
in general] may be beyond ascertainment even from the circumstantial evi-
dence."" 3
A. The Inherent Difficulty in Assessing Public Perceptions
In The Principles of Psychology, William James wrote, "a man has as many
social selves as there are individuals who recognize him.""14 Recent studies in
cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology have dissected the ways in
which we perceive and categorize people differently depending on numerous
factors, including, but not limited to, our own group membership, emotional
state, recent interactions with group members, the stereotypes that we hold
States has been bound since 1968"). The Supreme Court has also confirmed that
the basis for Congress's extremely broad power over aliens comes not from the
Constitution, but from international law. "It is an accepted maxim of interna-
tional law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions ... " Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Since
Congress's power over aliens rests at least in part on international law, courts
should consider international law norms in interpreting statutes that pertain to
aliens. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (loth Cir.
1981) ("[W1e note that in upholding the plenary power of Congress over exclusion
and deportation of aliens, the Supreme Court has sought support in international
law principles. It seems proper then to consider international law principles for
notions of fairness .... ") (citation omitted).
113. No. 72635/01, slip op. para. 168 (Refugee Status App. Auth. Sept. 6, 2002) (N.Z.),
available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/Ref_2002o9o6_72635.pdf.
114. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 280-81 (Frederick
Burkhardt & Fredson Thayer Bowers eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1981) (189o) (em-
phasis omitted).
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about particular groups, and perceptions of emotional displays."5 In other
words, social perception depends not only on the identity of the perceiver, but
the emotional states of the perceiver and the perceived at any given moment, as
well as the interactions that group members have had in the past. Social per-
ception may also be quite different "depending on whether perceivers put
themselves in the shoes of the perceived.""1
6
The concept of social perception becomes even fuzzier when one realizes
that our "momentary construals" of our own "ingroups" shape our judgments
about "outgroups.""17 Furthermore, "[s]ince nearly any kind of social judgment
implies a comparison to a standard, changing standards can have strong effects
on how people judge a particular target."" 8 How we perceive others is further
complicated because:
[e]very person belongs to a diverse variety of social categories (e.g.,
gender, ethnicity, occupation, etc.), and this complexity of identities
poses challenges for processes of social perception and impression
formation. Given the array of characteristics associated with each of a
target's social identities, the perceiver faces a glut of implied informa-
tion, not all of which will necessarily be useful in any given situation.
Social perceivers must navigate among these multiple categories when
115. See, e.g., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP PERCEPTION: PERCEIVED VARIABILITY, EN-
TIATIVITY, AND ESSENTIALISM (Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd & Olivier
Corneille eds., 2004) (discussing recent research in the study of group perception,
focusing on "entiativitiy," which means the extent to which an aggregate of indi-
viduals is perceived as a group, "variability," which refers to the extent to which
group members are perceived as homogenous or diverse, and "essentialism,"
which describes the extent to which social groups/categories are seen as natural
kinds); Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categoriza-
tion: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL.
ScI. 342, 345 (2004); Matthew D. Lieberman & Jennifer H. Pfeifer, The Self and So-
cial Perception: Three Kinds of Questions in Social Cognitive Neuroscience, in THE
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 195-235 (Alexander Easton &
Nathan J. Emery eds., 2005) (discussing how social stimuli are often ambiguous
and often interpreted in accordance with our self-serving biases).
u16. Lieberman & Pfeifer, supra note 115, at 223.
117. Bertram Gawronski, Galen V. Bodenhausen & Ranier Banse, We Are, Therefore
They Aren't: Ingroup Construal as a Standard of Comparison for Outgroup judg-
ments, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 515, 524 (2005) (internal citations
omitted). An "ingroup" is a social group towards which an individual feels loyalty
and respect, usually due to membership in the group. Id. An "outgroup," con-
versely, is a social group towards which the individuals feel contempt, opposition,
or a desire to compete. Id.
118. Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted).
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making decisions about others, constantly determining which catego-
ries are situationally important and which are not." 9
Consequently, an individual may be perceived as belonging to a particular so-
cial group in one situation but not in another, depending on which of the indi-
vidual's characteristics are most relevant in the given context.
These studies shed light on the inherent difficulties that adjudicators will
face in attempting to assess a given society's perception of a particular group,
especially if they consider visibility a static rather than dynamic phenomenon.
As Kenji Yoshino points out,
a common strategy employed to control invisible groups forces them to
convert their invisibility into visibility-through brandings, scarlet let-
ters, public notifications, and the like. Conversely, the discretion of in-
visible groups may be cabined by precluding them from voluntarily
converting their invisibility into visibility.
1 20
In short, it would be na'ive for adjudicators to treat social perception or social
visibility as a consistent and reliable means of determining whether a particular
social group exists. Whether a group is socially perceived as distinct cannot be
treated as an all-or-nothing phenomenon, as social perception is a "subjective
process shaped by an individual's current motivation, emotion, and cognition,
as well as his or her more long-standing traits," such as personality and as-
sumptions, beliefs and expectations about the self and the world.'2' In some
cases, the same group may be both socially invisible and hypervisible as a
stereotypical object. For example, in discussing the perception of blacks in the
United States, Patricia Williams writes, "[h]ow, or whether, blacks are seen de-
pends upon a dynamic of display that ricochets between hypervisibility and
oblivion."'22 While "the real lives of real blacks unfold outside the view of many
whites, the fantasy of black life as a theatrical enterprise is an almost obsessive
indulgence."'23 Williams's description echoes the experience of the unnamed
African-American narrator in Ralph Ellison's novel, Invisible Man, who is "in-
visible" simply because "people refuse to see [him]."2 4 He states, "[l]ike the
bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have
been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorted glass. When they approach me
they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-
119. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Category Membership Moderates the
Inhibition of Social Identities, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 233 (2004) (in-
ternal citations omitted).
120. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 1o8 YALE L.J. 485, 544 (1998).
121. Lieberman & Pfeifer, supra note 115, at 195.
122. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF
RACE 17 (1997).
123. Id.
124. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 7 (Penguin Books 1981) (1952).
HeinOnline -- 27 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 73 2008-2009
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
indeed, everything and anything except me."'25 Thus, even a physical character-
istic such as race can be visible and invisible at the same time, due to the "pecu-
liar disposition" of the eyes of the perceiver.126
Another problem that the emphasis on social perception poses in analyzing
a particular social group is that the group may be defined in terms of only one
aspect (or a few aspects) of the individual's identity, while social perception
may respond to multiple aspects of the individual's identity. For example, in the
case SB Moldova, where the UKAIT applied the social perception approach, the
tribunal accepted a particular social group that focused exclusively on one char-
acteristic of the appellant-having been trafficked for sexual exploitation in the
past-and ignored her gender, reasoning that both men and women could be
"former victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation" and that the social group
was therefore gender neutral. 2 ' In other words, the UKAIT artificially separated
the appellant's gender from her past experience of being trafficked. This type of
artificial separation is not usually possible, however, in analyzing social percep-
tions. Indeed, the evidence on which the UKAIT relied indicated that the vast
majority of sexual trafficking victims in Moldova are female.2 Moreover, the
stigma these women experience within their families and communities after
being sexually exploited is related to their gender, since they are perceived to be
akin to female prostitutes.2 9 Thus, the social perception analysis implicitly took
gender into account although the definition of the particular social group did
not.
Of course, social perceptions often do not capture the true complexity of an
individual's identity. "[T]he sheer complexity of social life, paired with an all-
too-common lack of motivation or capacity to process others in a complex
manner, can lead to focusing on just one of the many available categorizations"
and forming "a simplified impression of the target, based on the single, domi-
nant category." 3 Some studies indicate that if there are two competing catego-
ries-for example religion and sexual orientation-focusing on one category
actually tends to inhibit perception of the second category. 3' However, when
the categories are female gender and sexual exploitation, the cultural values and
stigmas associated with female sexuality clearly come into play, and the two
categories of gender and sexuality can be triggered simultaneously.' As previ-
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. SB [2008] UKAIT 00002, para. 53, available at http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/
Upload/j2o8 7/oooo2_ukait_2oo8_sb moldova-cg.doc.
128. Id. paras. 92-93.
129. Id. paras. 102-05.
130. Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, supra note 119, at 233 (internal citations omitted).
131. See id. at 237.
132. See, e.g., Svati P. Shah, Producing the Spectacle of Kamathipura: The Politics of Red
Light Visibility in Mumbai, 18 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 269, 270 (2006) (discussing
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ously noted, people have multiple, dynamic social identities that vary according
to context, and different aspects of identity may be more or less prominent in
any given situation. '33 While advocates and adjudicators may be able to tease
these identities apart in framing the particular social group, it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to do so in analyzing social per-
ception. Due to the various difficulties inherent in assessing social perception,
adjudicators may simply rely on assumptions, instincts, or generalizations
rather than actual evidence in determining whether or not a certain group is
perceived as a social group by society.3 4 For all of these reasons, the "social per-
ception" and "social visibility" approaches will result in inconsistent and inco-
herent decisions.
B. The Difficulty of Deriving "Social Perception" or "Social Visibility" from
Traditional Types of Documentary Evidence
The types of documentary evidence typically submitted in asylum cases
could never capture the complexity of social perceptions described above. In-
deed, adjudicators would be hard-pressed to derive even an oversimplified view
of social perceptions from State Department reports, human rights reports,
news articles, and other documents that focus on "objective" reporting. In A-
M-E-, for example, the record appears to have contained little, if any, direct
evidence of Guatemalan society's perceptions of the wealthy. The only direct
evidence of social perception of any kind mentioned in the decision pertains to
perceptions of crime. Specifically, the BIA quoted a passage from a U.S. State
how the discourse of trafficking has become largely synonymous with female
prostitution in the global South, excluding discussion of men or transgendered
people selling sexual services).
133. See, e.g., S. Alexander Haslam et al., Context-Dependent Variation in Social Stereo-
typing 1: The Effects of Intergroup Relations as Mediated by Social Change and
Frame of Reference, 22 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 3, 5 (1992). See generally Penelope J.
Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam & Katherine J. Reynolds, Social Categorization and
Social Context: Is Stereotype Change a Matter of Information or of Meaning?, in So-
CIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 55, 71 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A.
Hogg eds., 1999); S. Alexander Haslam & John C. Turner, Context-Dependent
Variation in Social Stereotyping 2: The Relationship Between Frame of Reference,
Self-Categorization and Accentuation, 22 EUR. J. Soc. PsYcHoL. 251, 251-77 (1992);
S. Alexander Haslam & John C. Turner, Context-Dependent Variation in Social
Stereotyping 3: Extremism as a Self- Categorical Basis for Polarized Judgment, 25
EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 341, 341-47 (1995).
134. This is particularly true in cases involving prostitution, whether forced or volun-
tary. See, e.g., X, T98-o6186, [1999] CanLII 14662 (Immigration & Refugee Bd.
Refugee Div. Nov. 2) (Can.), available at http://www.irb.gc.ca/en/decisions/
reflex/indexe.htm?action=article.view&id=2822 (asserting, without citing any
evidence, that "sex trade workers in almost any society, are easily identified and
associated in the eyes of others, most notably the police, as a particular group of
people").
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Department report that cited an August 1996 "public opinion poll" showing
that "70 percent of those interviewed considered violence the major problem in
Guatemala."'' 5 The report further stated that "[iun the past, most acts of vio-
lence in the country tended to be regarded as politically motivated, but the pub-
lic perception seems to be changing now that the civil war has ended."'' 6 It is
unclear from the BIA's decision whether or how these comments regarding per-
ception of crime affected the analysis, but they dearly do not address the issue
of how wealthy Guatemalans are socially perceived.
Given the dearth of direct evidence on social perception in typical back-
ground documents, adjudicators may place undue weight on whether a pro-
posed group has been subjected to past harm in determining whether society
recognizes the group. As both C-A- and A-M-E- recognize, the UNHCR Guide-
lines indicate that past harm may be a relevant factor in determining whether
society perceives a proposed group.'37 When no other evidence of perception is
available, however, adjudicators may end up relying primarily, if not exclu-
sively, on evidence of harm in analyzing the social group issue. The risk, of
course, is that the resulting analysis would confuse or conflate the "persecution"
(i.e., seriousness of harm), "well-founded fear" (i.e., level of risk), "on account
of" (i.e., causal nexus) and protected ground elements of the refugee definition,
making it impossible to determine whether a "particular social group" exists
without discussing the harm experienced or feared by the proposed group and
the causal connection between the shared characteristic and the harm. This is
exactly what happened in A-M-E-, where the BIA limited its analysis to whether
"wealthy Guatemalans would be recognized as a group that is at a greater risk of
crime in general or of extortion or robbery in particular.""8 Instead of simply ask-
ing whether "wealthy Guatemalans would be recognized as a group," the BIA
folded the feared persecution into the social group inquiry. Moreover, in em-
phasizing that crime cuts across all socioeconomic classes in Guatemala, the
BIA's discussion of "social visibility" appears more relevant to an analysis of the
nexus requirement than to the protected ground.' 9 While various courts have
135. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 75 (B.I.A. 2007) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Bu-
REAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, GUATEMALA-PROFILE OF
ASYLUM CLAIMS & COUNTRY CONDITIONS 4 (1997)).
136. Id.
137. UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 6,
para. 14.
138. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 74 (emphasis added).
139. On review, when the court in Ucelo-Gomez expanded on the reasons for rejecting
the proposed group, it similarly erred by conflating the "particular social group"
and "nexus" elements, stating:
[I]t matters that the petitioner's self-definition as a social group for asy-
lum purposes depends on no disadvantage other than purported visibil-
ity to criminals. When the harm visited upon members of a group is at-
tributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to
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endorsed a holistic approach to interpreting the refugee definition, a holistic
approach "does not deny the necessity to analyse each constituent element or to
examine the relationship of the elements to each other," as "[ilt is essential to
ensure that one element is not inadvertently given a function or meaning which
more properly belongs to another." 14 The "social visibility" approach signifi-
candy increases these risks, and will likely lead to incoherent, legally unsound
decisions. 41
Even in cases with more extensive documentary evidence that provide al-
ternative sources for analyzing social perception besides the experience of harm,
the "social visibility" test will be difficult to apply and may well result in incon-
sistent decisions. In SB, for example, the UKAIT clearly struggled with deter-
mining social perception, despite the case's thorough record, since the evidence
could be interpreted in different ways. For example, the evidence indicated that
Moldovans are very concerned about human trafficking, which the UKAIT
noted could be a "potential indicator[] as to whether trafficked victims are per-
ceived as being different by the surrounding society." 42 Immediately afterwards,
however, the UKAIT asserted that "the mere fact that there are high levels of
awareness of a particular problem in a given society does not mean that those
members of society in the problem group are perceived to be different by the
surrounding society."' 43
The UKAIT also struggled with inconsistencies in the evidence. For exam-
ple, it noted that, on the one hand, "the fact that Modlovans do not blame the
victims.., for their experience of having been trafficked... may be an indica-
tion that victims may not be perceived differently by the surrounding so-
ciety."' 44 On the other hand, however, it found that "the evidence of social stig-
matisation in Moldova ... against persons who have been trafficked for sexual
persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a
'particular social group' within the meaning of the [Immigration and Na-
tionality Act].
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007). In other words, the
Court found that the absence of a nexus decreased the likelihood of the existence
of a particular social group.
140. No. 74665/03, slip op. para. 48 (Refugee Status App. Auth. July 7, 2004)
(N.Z.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF_2004o7o7
_74665.pdf.
141. Since social perceptions and attitudes may also be relevant to showing that the
harm feared is on account of membership in a particular social group, adjudicators
applying the social perception approach are particularly likely to confuse or con-
flate the "nexus" and "protected ground" elements of the refugee definition.
142. SB [20081 UKAIT 00002 para. 96, available at http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/
Upload/j2087/Oooo2-ukait_2oo8_sb-moldova-cg.doc.
143. Id.
144. Id. para. 98.
HeinOnline -- 27 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 77 2008-2009
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
exploitation tends to go against any assumption along these lines.' 45 The UKAIT
reasonably found that this evidence of stigmatization, including the practice of
painting a prostitute's door black, was "indicative of societal attitudes towards
prostitutes in Moldova.' 46 After asserting its "misgivings about the evidence,"
the tribunal ultimately concluded that "individuals who have been trafficked for
the purposes of sexual exploitation are reasonably likely to be perceived as being
different by the surrounding society if the fact that they had been trafficked for
the purposes of sexual exploitation is known to the surrounding society.' ' 47
Overall, the UKAIT's analysis in SB conveys how challenging it can be for an
adjudicator to determine social perceptions even in well-documented cases.
The "social perception" and "social visibility" approaches to asylum claims
implicitly recognize the ways in which social judgments define who we are and
how our lives unfold; they also implicitly recognize that group categories are
largely imagined.' 48 For the same reasons, however, these approaches are inher-
ently difficult to apply: the complexity of the human mind can never be cap-
tured in a limited legal proceeding.
IV. THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE BIA's NEW "SOCIAL VISIBILITY"
TEST ON ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
The "social visibility" test not only represents a sudden departure from
precedent and is inherently difficult to apply, but also may pose significant new
challenges for asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender. Since
claims based on sexual orientation, especially those brought by women, provide
the clearest example of visibility's negative impact, I discuss these claims in the
most detail. I then discuss three other types of gender-related claims-those
based on family ties, domestic violence, and human trafficking-as additional
examples of how a "social visibility" test may lead to the exclusion of some of
the most vulnerable groups.149
145. Id.
146. Id. para. 105.
147. Id. at 1o6.
148. As the linguist George Lakoff notes, "there are a great many categories of mind
and language that are not reflections of alleged categories of the world." GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES RE-
VEAL ABOUT THE MIND 197 (1990).
149. In its amicus brief in Thomas, the UNHCR cautioned the BIA against requiring
either a "social perception" or "social visibility" test because "such a rigid ap-
proach... may disregard groups that the Convention is designed to protect."
UNHCR Brief in Thomas, supra note 57, at 10.
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A. The Potential Impact of the "Social Visibility" Test on Asylum Claims
Based on Sexual Orientation
While "homosexuals," "gay men," "gay men with female sexual identities,"
and, implicitly, "lesbians" have all been recognized as particular social groups in
the United States, requiring social visibility may make it more difficult to pre-
vail in asylum claims based on sexual orientation, particularly where the claim-
ants are women.' Unlike some characteristics or traits, sexual orientation is
not externally visible, and sexual minorities often feel compelled to hide their
orientation for various reasons. Writing about Latin America, Bill Fairbairn ex-
plains:
[T]he social stigma associated with homosexuality forces the majority
of lesbians and gay men to hide their sexual orientation.... Secrecy, si-
lence and invisibility are themselves contributing factors to the human
rights violations suffered by lesbians and gay men .... With few excep-
tions, most of the abuses committed against lesbians and gay men in
Latin America remain shrouded in silence, misinformation, and mis-
understanding.' 5'
These observations, which apply to gay men and lesbians in many countries
around the world, stress the link between invisibility and persecution. By re-
quiring social visibility to establish a particular social group, the BIA neglects
the ways that invisibility forms a core part of the experience of oppression."2 In
150. See, e.g., Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding, implicitly,
that a Ugandan lesbian was a member of a particular social group); Karouni v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that "all alien homosexuals
are members of a 'particular social group"'); Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1o84 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a "gay man with
a female sexual identity" as a member of a particular social group); Toboso-Al-
fonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 199o) (recognizing "homosexuals" as members of
a particular social group in a case involving a gay man from Cuba).
151. Bill Fairbairn, Gay Rights Are Human Rights: Gay Asylum Seekers in Canada, in
PASSING LINES 237, 243-44 (Brad Epps et al. eds., 2005) (emphasis added).
152. In Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005), the court reasoned that
even if the petitioner had not been "outed" as a gay man and was not at risk of
persecution in Lebanon based on his past homosexual acts, being forced to stay in
the closet and live a life of celibacy was not an "acceptable" option. Quoting the
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003), the Ninth
Circuit found that "' [w] hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring."' Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1173 The Court went on to explain that
"t]his is but one reason why 'the[] sexual identities [of homosexuals] are so fun-
damental to their human identities that they should not be required to change
them."' Id. (quoting Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094). Accordingly, the court
rejected the argument "that the [Immigration and Nationality Act] requires
Karouni to change 'an innate characteristic ... so fundamental,' or to relinquish
such an 'integral part of [his] human freedom."' Id. (internal citations omitted);
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"Marxist terms, invisibility is the most extreme form of alienation-the ulti-
mate manifestation of self-estrangement."' 53
As Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa elo-
quently stated in a decision invalidating South Africa's anti-sodomy laws:
In the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the scarring
comes not from poverty orpowerlessness, but from invisibility. It is the
tainting of desire, it is the attribution of perversity and shame to spon-
taneous bodily affection, it is the prohibition of the expression of love,
it is the denial of full moral citizenship in society because you are what
you are, that impinges on the dignity and self-worth of a group.
... Gays constitute a distinct though invisible section of the commu-
nity that has been treated not only with disrespect or condescension
but with disapproval and revulsion ... their identifying characteristic
combines all the anxieties produced by sexuality with all the alienating
14
effects resulting from difference ....
Justice Sachs's opinion forcefully demonstrates how oppressive domestic laws,
societal hostility, discrimination, and prejudice can force gays to remain socially
invisible. Ironically, a social visibility requirement will make it more difficult for
sexual minorities from the most oppressive countries to obtain asylum.'55
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's recent speech at Columbia
University highlights the significant gap in protection of sexual minorities that
may emerge because of a social visibility requirement.' 56 President Ahmedinejad
publicly maintained that Iranian homosexuals do not exist, although the inter-
national gay advocacy group Outrage reports over 40oo executions of gay men
see also Yoshino, supra note 120, at 547 (discussing the "dramatic" costs that con-
cealing identity imposes on invisible groups such as gays, including "the epistemic
harms of alienation, the onerous labor of passing, and the moral burden of doing
so," as well as "the ontic harm of identity erasure").
153. Lynn May Rivas, Invisible Labors: Caring for the Independent Person, in GLOBAL
WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEw ECONOMY 70, 79
(Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002).
154. Nat'l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1998 (1) SA 1 (CC)
paras. 127-28 (S. Afr.).
155. Cf. Fadi Hann, Soto Vega: Punishing Masculinity in Gay Asylum Claims, 114 YALE
L.J. 913, 918 (2005) (arguing that "reactionary covering," defined as "covering mo-
tivated by fear," is "more than mere evidence of fear of persecution: It constitutes
persecution").
156. See, e.g., CNN News, Ahmedinejad Speaks; Outrage and Controversy Follow, Sept.
24, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2oo7/US/o9/24/us.iran/index.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2oo8). President Ahmedinejad asserted that "[i]n Iran, there are no ho-
mosexuals like in your country." Id.
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and lesbians in Iran since the Ayatollah seized power in 1979. 7 Ahmedinejad's
point of view demonstrates how a society can publicly deny the existence of
sexual minorities, thereby rendering them socially "invisible" while at the same
time persecuting them. Moreover, it shows that a society can persecute indi-
viduals based on a certain trait or characteristic without ever recognizing indi-
viduals with that trait as having a special social identity, even though individuals
who possess the trait and the outside world may perceive the group to exist. The
BIA's social visibility test fails to take this into account, as neither C-A- nor A-
M-E- considers the perspective of the group members themselves, and C-A-
completely fails to consider an objective, third-party perspective, while A-M-E-
merely notes that the affluent do not seem to be subject to greater human rights
violations than the rest of society, without any further analysis of whether the
affluent objectively constitute a distinct social segment."58 As noted above, in
Applicant S, the High Court of Australia explicitly rejected such a narrow inter-
pretation of the social perception approach.'15 9
Before the Australian High Court repudiated its "discretion" requirement
in asylum cases based on sexual orientation-the requirement that applicants
adjust their behavior to become discreet and avoid persecution-the invisibility
of homosexuals in highly repressive countries such as Iran actually led to the
perverse conclusion that such countries were "tolerant" of homosexuality. 6 In
Appellant S395 /2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which
involved a gay couple from Bangladesh, the High Court of Australia implicitly
recognized the perversity of this logic in finding that "persecution does not
cease to be persecution for the purpose of the Convention because those perse-
cuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoiding action within the country of
157. See, e.g., Integrated Reg'l Info. Networks (IRIN), Iran: Activists Condemn Execu-
tion of Gay Teens, Jan. 27, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?
reportid=25296 (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
158. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 96o-61 (B.I.A. 2006) (considering only the perspective of
the Cali drug cartel and other drug cartels); A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 75 (B.I.A.
2007) (considering the "general societal perception" in Guatemala and "the point
of view of a criminal bent on extortion").
159. See supra Section I.B.
16o. See Nezhadian v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001)
F.C.A.14 15 (Fed. Ct.) (Austl.), affd Applicant W.A.B.R. v. Minister for Immigra-
tion & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 121 F.C.R. 196 (Austl.); Khalili v. Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [20011 F.C.A. 1404 (Fed. Ct.) (Austl.), aff"d
S.A.A.F. v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] F.C.A. 343
(Austl.); Jenni Millbank, Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee Claims on
the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 1 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 725, 731 & n.32 (2003) (cit-
ing Applicant S.A.A.M. v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002)
F.C.A. 444 para. 20 (Fed. Ct.) (Austl.)). The Federal Court has held that such con-
clusions are unreviewable. Gholami v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs (2001) F.C.A. 1O91 para. 14 (Fed. Ct.) (Austl.).
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nationality."' 6' The country conditions evidence submitted in the case indicated
that "homosexuality is not accepted or condoned by society in Bangladesh, that
it is not possible to live openly as a homosexual, but that people prefer to ignore
the issue rather than confront it, and that 'Bangladeshi men can have homosex-
ual affairs or relationships, provided they are discreet."" 62 In other words, as in
Iran, gay men in Bangladesh remained largely invisible in society. The tribunal
had denied the men's claims on the basis that they could avoid persecution in
Bangladesh by being "discreet" about their sexual orientation and relationships.
Although the High Court's decision focused on this "discretion requirement,"
which it ultimately rejected as discriminatory, and not on "social perception" of
homosexuals per se, the decision provides valuable insight into the ways in
which a social perception requirement could lead to bizarre results.'6 3 Likewise,
in Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Au-
thority explained that most homosexuals in Iran must carefully hide their sex-
ual orientation in order "[t]o avoid severe criminal penalties, extrajudicial beat-
ings, societal disapproval, public humiliation, discrimination and unequal
treatment.' 6 4 This decision highlights how group members may remain invisi-
161. Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003)
216 C.L.R. 473 (Austl.) (McHugh & Kirby, JJ.); see also Catherine Dauvergne &
Jenni Millbank, Before the High Court, Applicants S396/2002 and S395/2002, A Gay
Refugee Couple from Bangladesh, 25 SYDNEY L. REv. 97, 104 (2003) (noting "the
paradox involved in characterizing various regimes as 'tolerant' of something that
is officially non-existent and kept secret through the force of legal proscriptions
and extreme cultural hostility).
162. Gholami, at (2OOl) F.C.A. lO91 para. 5.
163. See also Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting argu-
ments that gay individuals can avoid persecution by being discreet or refraining
from homosexual conduct).
164. No. 74665/03, slip op. para. 126 (Refugee Status App. Auth. July 7, 2004), available
at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF-20040707-74665.pdf (holding
that a homosexual from Iran "who is discreet and who is unknown to the au-
thorities" remains at risk of being persecuted). In this case, the Authority took the
"being persecuted" element as the starting point of its analysis because it "al-
low[ed] identification of the boundaries set by international human rights law for
both the individual and the state." Id. para. 120. Identifying these boundaries, in
turn, made it "possible to determine whether the proposed action by the claimant
is at the core of the right or at its margins and whether the prohibition or re-
striction imposed by the state is lawful in terms of international human rights
law."Id. The Authority reasoned that "[i]f the proposed action is at the core of the
right and the restriction unlawful," then "the claimant has no duty to avoid the
harm by being discreet or by complying with the wishes of the persecutor." Id.
Whether the claimant "choose[s] to carry out the intended conduct or to act 'rea-
sonably' or 'discreetly' in order to avoid the threatened serious harm" is not rele-
vant to the analysis because "[nione of these choices ... engages the Refugee
Convention." Id.
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ble even if there is "strong religious and societal disapproval of homosexual-
ity."1165
Roger Lancaster has used the term "public secret" to describe "the uneasy
predicament of queers in Nicaragua.' 66 He explains,
In public secrecy, one is neither completely hidden nor, short of catas-
trophe, completely exposed, but always, it would seem, on the cusp of
the two: concealed within what is revealed, and revealed within what is
concealed; installed in a liminal space of magical transformations and
creative spectacle but also of terror, madness, and paranoia. 6 z
According to Lancaster,
[T]olerant intolerance... explains the somewhat schizoid picture con-
veyed by ethnographic and historical reports on sexual cultures in
Latin America: on the one hand, the happy-go-lucky adventurism of
carnival transvestism and z6calo cruising; on the other, the everyday
brutality of inescapable stigma and relentless taunting. Whether one
sees expression or repression, tolerance or intolerance, depends on
where one looks, on which conversations, and in what settings, one
participates. 68
Lancaster's words emphasize that social perception and visibility depend highly
on context. Visibility depends not only on who is looking and where, but also
on contemporaneous economic, political, and cultural events. For example,
middle-class gay men may suddenly become much more visible during a
"moral renovation" campaign linked to a political legitimacy crisis and crack-
downs on gay subcultures.,61 This is one reason why the BIA's interpretation of
"social visibility" in C-A- and A-M-E- is so problematic: it suggests that social
visibility is a black or white phenomenon without recognizing the shades of
gray in between, and ostensibly without any awareness that the same group may
be able to move between visibility and invisibility depending on time and con-
text. Lancaster's analysis also highlights why the social perception approach
raises such complex evidentiary issues. Country conditions documents and
human rights reports rarely convey the complexity of the "schizoid picture"
that Lancaster describes.
The complexity surrounding the "social visibility" of sexual minorities in
general makes application of the social perception test to this group very chal-
lenging and, as discussed above, may well lead to paradoxical and grossly unfair
results. "When covering [i.e. passing] is the result of fear, denial of asylum
based even in part on gay visibility contravenes the central goal of asylum
165. Id. para. 126.
166. Roger N. Lancaster, Tolerance and Intolerance in Sexual Cultures in Latin America,
in PASSING LINES, supra note 151, at 262 (internal citations omitted).
167. Id. at 263.
168. Id. at 264.
169. Id. at 266.
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law." 7 ' Asylum claims brought by lesbians, in particular, are likely to be detri-
mentally impacted by the social visibility requirement. While gay men's sexu-
alities sometimes have a public face, lesbians often remain completely invisible
in the public sphere.' 7' Researchers investigating how gender shapes gay and les-
bian geographies confirm that "gay men often... [produce] highly visible ter-
ritorial enclaves in inner-city areas, whereas lesbian forms of territoriality at the
urban scale ... [often remain] 'invisible' since their communities are consti-
tuted through social networks rather than commercial sites."'72 The "complete
lack of visibility of lesbians" from the public sphere "has been noted as an act of
repression in and of itself."'73
Likewise, the type of harm that lesbians experience "does not often take
place in the public arena.' 1 74 A comparative study of refugee decisions from
Canada and Australia found that "[l]esbians had great difficulty grounding
their claims, as their experiences were 'too private,' while the experiences of gay
men were often characterized as 'too public.""75 The "private" harm experi-
enced by lesbians may include physical and sexual abuse by family members or
other non-governmental individuals; forced marriages; coercive and harmful
medical or psychological "treatment"; family isolation and ostracism; and evic-
tion from the home. These risks are, of course, compounded by institutional-
ized discrimination against women and sexual minorities. In order to avoid the
harm that results from visibility, lesbians may marry men, lead double lives, or
otherwise attempt to pass as heterosexual, which reduces the likelihood that
they will be perceived socially as gay. The economic oppression of women in
general may also force lesbians to remain silent about their sexual orientation;
170. Hanna, supra note 155, at 918. Hanna borrows the term "covering" from constitu-
tional law scholar Kenji Yoshino and sociologist Erving Goffman, who use it to
describe how individuals downplay stigmatized identities, even when those iden-
tities are known to the world. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102 (1963) ("It is a fact that persons who are
ready to admit possession of a stigma ... may nonetheless make a great effort to
keep the stigma from looming large ... this process will be referred to as cover-
ing."); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
91-92 (2006) (describing four axes along which individuals can cover: "appear-
ance," or how an individual physically presents himself to the world, "affiliation,"
which concerns cultural identifications, "activism," which concerns how much
someone politicizes his identity, and "association," which concerns someone's
choice of companions).
171. Millbank, supra note 16o, at 725-36, 729.
172. Julie A. Podmore, Gone 'Underground'? Lesbian Visibility and the Consolidation of
Queer Space in Montreal, 7 Soc. & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 595, 595 (2006).
173. Victoria Neilson, Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based Asylum Jurispru-
dence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 417, 437 (2005).
174. Id. at 426.
175. Millbank, supra note 16o, at 725-26.
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they cannot risk losing family support if it means foregoing their only security
network. Consequently, it is often easier for financially privileged women to be
"out" (and therefore visible) than for working-class and poor women, and it is
often easier for gay men to be "out" than for lesbians.' 76
Lesbians are able to pass as heterosexual more easily than gay men because
stereotypes about women as passive objects of male desire contribute to the in-
visibility of female sexuality in general, and lesbian sexuality in particular. "To
acknowledge lesbians would allow women an active sexuality that is not part of
'women's destiny."" 77 In Western societies, there have been fewer explicit pro-
hibitions on women's homosexual behavior than men's homosexual behavior
due, in large part, to disbelief that women engage in such behavior. For exam-
ple, it is widely rumored that the reason female homosexual behavior was never
criminalized in the United Kingdom was because Queen Victoria did not be-
lieve that sex between women was possible.'78 Even in 1921, when a proposal to
criminalize lesbianism came before the House of Lords, it was argued that 999
women out of looo had "never even heard a whisper of these practices. 1 79
Not only government officials, but also ethnographers could not even
imagine the possibility of married women engaging in non-heterosexual sex
practices 8o Where men were available as sexual partners, it was simply assumed
that lesbianism did not exist. 8' Indeed, until relatively recently, Western observ-
ers and scholars remained largely silent on the topic of female sexuality.18 Such
silence, due partly to the limitations of the observers and partly to problems in
collecting and interpreting data, has led to a dearth of information about lesbi-
ans around the world. 8 Not only social scientists but also human rights report-
ers have found it difficult to gather information about lesbians:
176. See generally URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF
GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995) (emphasizing that homophobia does not
occur in a vacuum and has dimensions of gender, race, class, age, and ability);
David P. Becker, Growing up in Two Closets: Class and Privilege in the Lesbian and
Gay Community, in QUEERLY CLASSED 227, 230 (Susan Raffo ed., 1997) (describ-
ing why "it is easier for lesbians and gay men with wealth to come out sexually").
177. Alison J. Murray, Let Them Take Ecstasy: Class and Jakarta Lesbians, in FEMALE
DESIRES: SAME-SEx RELATIONS AND TRANSGENDER PRACTICES ACROSS CUL-
TURES 139,145 (Evelyn Blackwood & Saskia E. Wieringa eds., 1999).
178. LAURA DOAN, FASHIONING SAPPHISM: THE ORIGINS OF A MODERN ENGLISH
LESBIAN CULTURE 56 (2001).
179. Id.
18o. Evelyn Blackwood & Saskia E. Wieringa, Sapphic Shadows: Challenging the Silence
in the Study of Sexuality, in FEMALE DESIRES: SAME-SEx RELATIONS AND
TRANSGENDER PRACTICES ACROSS CULTURES, supra note 177, at 39, 41.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 39.
183. Id.
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"[d]ocumentation on the 'invisible lesbian' has been, as the term suggests, no-
toriously hard to produce for traditional rights groups.' i 4
Even without a social visibility requirement, the scarcity of documentation
about lesbians can present a significant challenge in asylum claims. For exam-
ple, a 2004 decision by the UKAIT denied a lesbian claimant asylum based on
its finding that there was no evidence of discriminatory laws against lesbians in
Serbia and Montenegro.' Furthermore, in a 2001 decision denying asylum to
an Iranian lesbian who testified that she fled Iran after her former lover in-
formed her university of her sexual orientation, Canada's Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB) found that the applicant was not credible and had failed to
show that she was really a lesbian. 6 However, the Refugee Division eventually
held that even if the applicant were really a lesbian, there was only a mere possi-
bility that she would face persecution in Iran. Although Iranian laws punish
homosexuality by death, the documentary evidence indicated that homosexuals
rarely are tried or sentenced. The paucity of country conditions evidence re-
garding the treatment of lesbians also makes the issue of internal relocation par-
ticularly challenging. For example, in Parrales v. Canada Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration, the Federal Court of Canada reviewed an asylum case involv-
ing a Mexican lesbian who had been seriously assaulted several times in Mex-
ico."s7 The court found that the documentary evidence indicated Mexico City
was relatively safe for lesbians in general, but reversed on the basis that the Im-
migration and Refugee Board had failed to give sufficient attention to whether
it was reasonable to expect the claimant in her particular circumstances to relo-
cate to Mexico City.' These cases highlight some of the challenges involved
when lesbians bring asylum claims. The relatively small number of successful
asylum cases brought by lesbians as compared to gay men further stresses the
obstacles involved.
184. Alice Miller, Gay Enough: Some Tensions in Seeking the Grant of Asylum and Pro-
tecting Global Sexual Diversity, in PASSING LINES, supra note 151, at 158.
185. DM [2004] UKAIT 00288, http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/Upload/j922/2004_ukiat
_00288_dm serbiaandmontenegro.doc (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).
186. X, TAo-o5930, [2001] CanLI1 26956 (Immigration & Refugee Bd.
Refugee Div. May 17), http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/irb/doc/200l/20oicanlii26956/
20oicanlii26956.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2oo8); cf. Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d
1027 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that an Immigration Judge's findings that a gay ap-
plicant from Albania was not credible because his mannerisms and speech did not
indicate that he was homosexual, and because he had not reported instances of
abuse to the authorities or an LGBT rights organization, were clearly erroneous
and tainted the entire decision).
187. Parrales v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2006] F.C. 504 (Fed.
Ct.) (Can.), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/20o6/2oo6fcso4/2oo6fcso4
.html.
188. Id.
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Requiring social visibility as an element of a "particular social group" not
only will make it more difficult for lesbians to prevail in asylum claims, but also
may have the discriminatory effect of rendering only effeminate men or "butch"
women eligible for asylum because they are the only ones perceived as homo-
sexual by their societies. For example, in Indonesia:
Where tomboys are clearly marked linguistically in West Sumatra,
their sexual partners or lovers have no distinct designation or identity
but belong to the category woman. Like an earlier generation of
femmes in the U.S.... the partner is nearly invisible in rural areas.
These women maintain a 'feminine' gender, that is, they adhere to the
hegemonic standards of femininity in their appearance and behav-
ior.'""9
Applying the BIA's new "social visibility" test in this scenario could lead to the
rejection of "femme" lesbians who are perceived as straight in their societies.
Since C-A- requires the group members to be visible, claims brought by indi-
viduals who do not conform to societal stereotypes may be rejected under the
"social visibility" test.
In addition to excluding individuals who conform to certain gender norms
and therefore, either intentionally or unintentionally, pass as straight, the social
visibility requirement also could exclude those who have no opportunity to
"come out," much less organize publicly. In Zimbabwe, for example, many
"black lesbians have no opportunities to come out because they are so con-
trolled by their families and by society.... [B]lack lesbians remain[] fairly in-
visible."' 90 The "social visibility" requirement also would exclude lesbians who
choose to organize under a broader, less controversial rubric, such as "single
women," for strategic or political reasons. In other words, this requirement
might well lead to the same discriminatory results as the "discretion" re-
quirement that the High Court of Australia and the New Zealand Refugee
Status Appeals Authority repudiated as a violation of fundamental human
rights.' 9' The intent of the Refugee Convention is to protect individuals who
face persecution because of a lesbian or gay identity, which is "distinct from so-
cial perception of what is 'gay."" 9 Thus, application of a "social visibility" test
189. Evelyn Blackwood, Tombois in West Sumatra: Constructing Masculinity and Erotic
Desire, in FEMALE DESIRES: SAME-SEx RELATIONS AND TRANSGENDER PRAC-
TICES ACROSS CULTURES, supra note 177, at 187.
19o. Margrete Aarmo, How Homosexuality Became "Un-African": The Case of Zim-
babwe, in FEMALE DESIRES: SAME-SEx RELATIONS AND TRANSGENDER PRAC-
TICES ACROSS CULTURES, supra note 177, at 255, 272.
191. See Hanna, supra note 155, at 916 (arguing that asylum cases punish homosexuals
who "cover" their sexuality and that "the covering-spectrum framework incor-
rectly assumes that homosexual men who cover are less vulnerable to persecution
and unjustifiably treats gays who cover as a social group distinct from those who
don't").
192. Id. at 920.
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to these cases may contravene the very purpose of the Convention, which per-
tains to the protection of fundamental human rights and the principle of non-
discrimination .1 93
Since homosexuality is now well established as the basis for a particular so-
cial group in the United States and many other countries, some might question
what impact a social visibility requirement really would have on such cases. In
at least one unpublished decision, however, the BIA already has used the "social
visibility" test to limit the circumstances under which persons with an im-
mutable characteristic constitute a "particular social group." Specifically, in
Thomas, discussed below, the BIA limited the criteria that determine when a
family constitutes a particular social group, flying in the face of precedent and
requiring the relevant family to be visible to society at large. 94 The BIA could
easily apply the same logic in finding that homosexuals comprise a particular
social group only if their sexual orientation is visible. At a minimum, the "social
visibility" test likely will lead to confusion and inconsistent, unprincipled deci-
sions by immigration judges in cases involving sexual orientation.
B. The Potential Impact of the "Social Visibility" Test on Other Types of
Gender-Related Asylum Claims
Gender-based social groups clearly involve an innate and immutable char-
acteristic. 95 Even if an individual can change his or her gender, it is nevertheless
"immutable" in the sense that it is a characteristic so fundamental to identity
that no one should have to change it. Significantly, the recognition of gender as
an immutable characteristic that can define a particular social group had its
roots in Acosta, which noted that "[t] he shared characteristic might be an innate
one such as sex. "'96 While claims brought by women can, of course, be based on
any of the five protected grounds, the particular social group ground is the one
most frequently relied upon by women "at risk of persecution because they are
193. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
194. See Thomas, No. A75-597-o331-o34/-o35/-o36 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007); see also infra
Subsection III.B.i (discussing the BIA's unpublished decision in Thomas).
195. HATHAwAY, supra note 21, at 162; Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference:
Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 518 (1989) (arguing
that gender falls within the ambit of the particular social group category).
196. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985); Anker, supra note 24, at 2o. In July
1985, a few months after the BIA issued its decision in Acosta, the UNHCR first
recognized that "women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment
due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live
may be considered as a 'particular social group."' U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees
[UNHCR], Executive Comm., Refugee Women and International Protection, Con-
clusion No. 39, para. (k), U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/2/Rev. 1986 (Oct. 18, 1985).
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women."' 97 The promulgation of gender guidelines by the UNHCR and numer-
ous countries, including the United States, has helped adjudicators to "mov[e]
away from paradigms dominated by the experiences of male refugees, and to-
wards a gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive interpretation and application of
refugee law."'19 Despite these guidelines, however, and "[diespite the logic of
the well established Acosta ruling, courts, adjudicators and advocates have for
many years shirked naming sex, gender or women as a [particular social group]
in itself.' 99 While the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada,
197. FOSTER, supra note 3, at 324; see also HEAVEN CRAWLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER
72-75 (2001) (arguing that all five protected grounds must be interpreted in a gen-
der-sensitive manner).
198. Edwards, supra note 14, at 52; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MEMORANDUM,
GUIDELINES, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE, REGARDING ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CASES ON THE BASIS OF
GENDER (1996), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm; AUSTL. DEP'T OF
IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN
VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION-MAKERS
(1996); CAN. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD., WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEAR-
ING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION: UPDATE (1996); U.N. High Comm'r for
Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women UN Doc.
ES/SCP/67 (July 1991) (all endorsing gender sensitive and gender inclusive inter-
pretations of refugee law). The UNHCR subsequently has issued several guide-
lines that specifically discuss gender as a particular social group. See, e.g., U.N.
High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCRI, Guidelines on International Protection: The
Application of Article iA (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Traf-
ficked, HCR/GIP/o6/07 (April 2006) [hereinafter UNHCR, Trafficking Guidelines];
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on International Protec-
tion: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article LA(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
HCR/GIP/02/o1 para. 30, May 7, 2002 [hereinafter UNHCR, Gender Guidelines];
UNHCR, Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 6,
paras. 12, 19.
199. Anker, supra note 24, at 201-02; see also FOSTER, supra note 3, at 325
("[N]otwithstanding the important progress that has been made in achieving rec-
ognition of the fundamental notion that women are capable of constituting a
[particular social group], decision-makers continue to display difficulty (and
sometimes reticence) in upholding gender-based claims."). Whether women con-
stitute a particular social group is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. For
some of the most influential writing on this subject, see CRAWLEY, supra note 197,
at 70-77; THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STUDIES 115-28 (2000);
Anker, supra notes 12 and 26; Jane Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as a Particu-
lar Social Group, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 115 (1997); Maryellen Fullerton, A Com-
parative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Par-
ticular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505 (1993); Lisa Gilad, The Problem of
Gender-Related Persecution: A Challenge of International Protection, in ENGEN-
DERING FORCED MIGRATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Doreen Indra ed., 1999);
Pamela Goldberg, Where in the World Is There Safety for Me?: Women Fleeing
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and the House of Lords now all recognize particular social groups defined by
gender, the United States has been reluctant to follow suit.2"' In specific cases,
the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized that gender may define a
particular social group, while decisions by the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Cir-
cuits have rejected particular social groups defined, in part, by gender.0 1 As
Deborah Anker points out, "[tIhe recognition of gender itself as defining a [par-
ticular social group] has encountered opposition based on a misunderstanding
Gender-Based Persecution, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 345 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Great-
batch, supra note 195; Rodger Haines, Gender-Related Persecution, in UNHCR's
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS, supra note 2; Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213 (1995); David L. Neal, Women as a
Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988).
200. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar [2002] HCA 14,
210 C.L.R. 1, 13-14 (Austl.); Ward v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739;
Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.).
201. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (approving a
particular social group defined as "Somalian females" or "young girls in the Bena-
diri clan" in a case involving female genital mutilation); Fatin v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1341 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a subgroup of
Iranian feminists who refuse to conform to the government's gender-specific laws
and norms may constitute a particular social group). In Mohammed, the Ninth
Circuit stressed the BIA's long-standing decision in Acosta, stating "[a]lthough we
have not previously expressly recognized females as a social group, the recognition
that girls or women of a particular clan or nationality (or even in some circum-
stances females in general) may constitute a social group is simply a logical appli-
cation of our law. Few would argue that sex or gender, combined with clan mem-
bership or nationality, is not an 'innate characteristic,' 'fundamental to individual
identity."' Mohammed, 400 F. 3d at 797 (emphasis added); see also Niang v. Gon-
zales, 422 F.3d 1187 (ioth Cir. 2005) (finding that females belonging to the Tuku-
lor-Fulani tribe in Senegal constitute a particular social group in a case involving
female genital mutilation, and noting that the court was "not persuaded that the
BIA, contrary to the language of Acosta, requires more than gender plus tribal
membership to identify a social group"). But see Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d
551, 555-56 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting "young (or those who appear to be young),
attractive Albanian women who are forced into prostitution" as a particular social
group and distinguishing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mohammed on the basis
that "Rreshpja did not introduce any evidence to show that the practice of forcing
young women into prostitution in Albania is nearly as pervasive as the practice of
female genital mutilation in Somalia"); Safaie v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the claim that "Iranian women, by
virtue of their innate characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed
upon them, are a particular social group"); Gomez v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 947 F.2d 66o, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the claim that "women
who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas" are a par-
ticular social group).
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that it is overbroad and in effect would recognize every woman in certain coun-
tries as a refugee," when, in fact, only claimants who meet all of the statutory
requirements would be eligible for asylum." 2 In order to circumvent adjudica-
tors' fears of opening the "floodgates" to define particular social groups in
terms of gender, applicants often define groups in "overly complicated and un-
necessarily detailed" ways, including characteristics such as marital status, age,
education level, the absence of male protection, opposition to abuse, trans-
gression of social/cultural norms, and past experiences of harm." 3
The BIA's new "social visibility" test will make it even harder to define the
social group in gender-related cases and will make it easier for fearful adjudi-
cators to reject such groups. This Section illuminates the potential impact of so-
cial visibility on three types of claims commonly brought by women: those
based on (1) family membership; (2) domestic violence; and (3) human
trafficking.
1. Claims Based on Family Membership
Since Acosta, the BIA and circuit courts consistently have held that the fam-
ily provides a prototypical example of a particular social group.20 4 Decisions by
202. Anker, supra note 24, at 201 (citing Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir.
2005) ("We do not necessarily agree with the Ninth Circuit's determination that
virtually all of the women in Somalia are entitled to asylum in the United
States.")).
203. FOSTER, supra note 3, at 326-28 (noting that "there is a tendency, found generally
in the [particular social group] jurisprudence, but particularly heightened in that
relating to gender, to formulate overly complicated and unnecessarily detailed
[particular social groups], rather than simply to find that 'women' or 'gender'
constitutes the relevant [particular social group]"). Foster notes that Canada "is
the most comfortable with the notion that 'women' or 'gender' may constitute a
[particular social group]," but cites examples of overly complicated definitions in
Canada, Australia, and the United States. Id. at 326-27 nn.156-6o.
204. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d
228, 235 ( 4th Cir. 2004) ("We join our sister circuits in holding that 'family' con-
stitutes a 'particular social group."'); Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir.
2004) ("Like our sister circuits, we recognize that a family is a social group.");
Aguirre-Cervantes v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 242 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9 th
Cir. 2001) (finding that "[flamily membership is clearly an immutable character-
istic, fundamental to one's identity" in a case involving a young Mexican girl who
had been abused by her father); Iliev v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 127
F.3 d 638, 642 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Our case law has suggested, with some cer-
tainty, that a family constitutes a cognizable 'particular social group."'); Hamzehi
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 64 F.3 d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1995) (implic-
itly recognizing family membership as a basis for a particular social group); Fatin
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F. 3 d 1233, 1238-40 (3d Cir. 1993) (ac-
cepting that "kinship ties" qualify as a particular social group); Gebremichael v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 1o F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) ("There can, in
fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common identifiable and
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foreign courts and legal scholars confirm that the family constitutes a class ex-
ample of a particular social group."°5 Claims based on family membership are
particularly important for vulnerable individuals, especially women and chil-
dren, since the persecuting state or non-state actors often "target family mem-
bers when they cannot or dare not target their intended victim."206
The BIA's unpublished decision in Thomas, which was issued after the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case pursuant to the Supreme Court's order, high-
lights how requiring social visibility may seriously limit the family as a particu-
lar social group despite its archetypal status.0 7 Michelle Thomas was a citizen of
South Africa whose racist father-in-law, known as "Boss Ronnie," abused his
workers."' s Seeking revenge, some of the workers attacked Thomas and her chil-
dren in place of Boss Ronnie, although she disagreed with his views and ac-
tions.0 9 Going against twenty years of precedents, the government argued on
appeal that the family unit does not comprise a particular social group. ' In re-
jecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, "there is nothing in the stat-
ute itself, nor in the BIA's interpretation of the relevant provisions, to suggest
that membership in a family is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute a par-
ticular social group.".' The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision
due to an error of administrative law, reasoning that the Ninth Circuit should
immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family."); Sanchez-Trujillo v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 8O F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (recogniz-
ing a group of family members as a "prototypical example" of a particular social
group); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996) (indicating that even distant relatives
can constitute a social group).
205. See, e.g., Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Sarrazola [19991
F.C.A. 1134 (Austl.) (finding that a family member could assert a claim to refugee
protection when the motive for persecuting the principal member of the family
was not on account of one of the five protected grounds); Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't v. K [2oo6] 1 A.C. 412 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales)
(U.K.) (finding that an Iranian woman was persecuted on account of her mem-
bership of the particular social group of her husband's family); see also HATHA-
WAY, supra note 21, at 165-66 ("As a rule.., whenever there is an indication that
the status or activity of a claimant's relative is the basis for a risk of persecution, a
claim grounded in family background is properly receivable under the social
group category."); Anker, supra note 24, at 207 (confirming that family has been
accepted as the "quintessential" example of a particular social group).
206. Anker, supra note 24, at 206.
207. Thomas, No. A75-597-o331-o34/-o35/-o36 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007); see also Thomas v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3 d 1177, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), vacated 547 U.S. 183
(20o6).
2o8. Thomas, 409 F.3 d at 1181-82.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1n88.
211. Id.
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have remanded the case to the BIA because "the agency [had] not yet consid-
ered whether [petitioner's] family presents the kind of 'kinship ties' that consti-
tute a 'particular social group." '12
Upon remand to the BIA, the Department of Homeland Security argued
that, under C-A-, a family unit cannot constitute a cognizable particular social
group unless the relationship that unifies it "is so significant in the society in
question that the people who share it are distinguished from other groups or
from society at large." '213 The UNHCR's amicus brief sharply criticized this for-
mulation, rejecting the notion that a family must be "famous" or "visible to so-
ciety at large" in order to constitute a particular social group. 14 Likewise, the
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic's amicus brief argued that "applica-
tion of a 'social visibility test' in all social group cases would be fundamentally
inconsistent with the Board's reasoning in Acosta," since "family relationships
are innate and cannot be changed (in the case of a blood relationship), or are so
fundamental to identity or conscience that the individual ought not be required
to disavow them (in the case of marriage).2 115 Nevertheless, in its unpublished
decision, the BIA relied on the social visibility test to sharply limit when family
may constitute a particular social group, stating:
Not all groups that have an immutable or fundamental characteristic
will be considered particular social groups for purposes of asylum. As
we explained in C-A-, supra, the group must also have a distinct, rec-
ognizable identity in the particular country at issue. See C-A-, supra, at
959-6o. The group must be perceived as being different from other
groups or from society at large. See [A-M-E-], supra .... While not
every family will have the distinct, recognizable identity in society that
is necessary to be a particular social group, some families certainly
will."16
In Thomas's case, the BIA accepted "Boss Ronnie's family" as a particular social
group because the parties agreed "that the family of Boss Ronnie has a distinct,
recognizable identity, such that they are perceived as being different from other
groups within their society or from society at large."" 7 In other cases, however,
where the relevant family is an ordinary one and not so well known, the "social
visibility" test may have a detrimental effect. Requiring families to be famous
212. Thomas, 547 U.S. at 186.
213. Supplemental Brief for Dep't of Homeland Security at io, Thomas, No. A75-597-
0331-034/-035/-036 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Re-
view).
214. UNHCR Brief in Thomas, supra note 57, at 13.
215. Supplemental Brief of Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinic & the Women's
Refugee Project as Amicus Curiae at 14, 17, Thomas, No. A75-597-o 331-o 34 /-o3 5/
-036 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
216. Thomas, No. A75-597-o331-o34/-o35/-o36, slip op. at 6 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007).
217. Id.
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(or infamous) in order to constitute a particular social group not only will lead
to the rejection of many gender-based claims, but will also undermine claims
brought by vulnerable children who risk persecution because of an unpopular
or stigmatized family member, or whose family members abuse them at home
or traffic them for sex or labor."' If the BIA can use the social visibility test to
limit a particular social group that is as well-established as the family unit, then
it certainly can use visibility to constrain or undermine groups that courts have
only recently recognized in gender-related cases.
2. Claims Based on Domestic Violence
Given the invisibility of domestic violence as a phenomenon, as well as the
invisibility of its victims, the BIA's new emphasis on "social visibility" likely will
impede the significant strides that have been made during the past two decades
in bringing asylum claims on this basis. 9 Social scientists describe the large-
scale invisibility of domestic violence as the "iceberg phenomenon":
As the "iceberg" image suggests, recorded or official cases represent
only a minimal portion of the problem of family violence in society.
The majority of cases of violence fall "below the water line", invisible
both socially and institutionally. That is, despite the increased social
acknowledgment and concern with regard to family violence, it is still a
largely hidden problem.22°
Like sexual orientation, domestic violence may be considered a "public secret."
Domestic violence remains largely invisible for many reasons, including wide-
218. Foster notes that "[w]hile family-related claims are well established in the situa-
tion where a child will likely suffer persecution because of his or her association
with a political or religious family member, for example, a more recent set of cases
has raised the question whether the family can constitute a [particular social
group] when a family member is inflicting the relevant harm." FOSTER, supra note
3, at 336. Adjudicators have considered this issue in the context of claims based on
domestic violence as well as where parents have trafficked their children for sex or
labor. Id. at 336-37. Foster cites numerous decisions by Canada's Convention
Refugee Determination Decision finding that the family constitutes a particular
social group in cases involving children. Id. at 336-37 & nn.197-98, 202; see also
Aguirre-Cervantes v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.
2001) (recognizing the family as a particular social group in a claim brought by a
young Mexican girl who had been abused by her father).
219. See generally Anker, supra note 12 (discussing some of the strides made in asylum
claims based on domestic violence); Edwards, supra note 14, at 53 ("Victims of do-
mestic violence where the State is unable or unwilling to intervene to provide pro-
tection have in recent years increasingly also been recognized as refugees, not least
as a result of evolving jurisprudence on 'membership of a particular social
group.').
220. Enrique Garcia, Social Visibility and Tolerance to Family Violence, 7 PSYCHOL.
SPAIN 39, 39-45 (2003).
27:47 2008
HeinOnline -- 27 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 94 2008-2009
THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF "SOCIAL VISIBILITY" IN DEFINING A "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP"
spread social tolerance and the social prominence of an idealized view of the
home and family life. Women may hide their situations due to shame, fear of
reprisal by an abuser, fear that their children may also become victims, financial
or psychological dependence on the abuser, lack of social support, fear of being
blamed by society, or general feelings of helplessness.
The social stigma attached to abuse may make women reluctant to seek
help or discuss their situations openly. Likewise, social norms that legitimate or
even glorify domestic violence against women may convince women to accept
their situations in silence. This problem is compounded by social isolation,
which makes it harder for abused women to find help and decreases their social
visibility. Deep-rooted ideas about the privacy of the family also reduce the
sense of community responsibility for women subjected to domestic violence,
which, in turn, makes them less visible. Requiring social visibility for women
subjected to domestic violence is particularly inappropriate since such violence,
by definition, occurs in the private sphere. As the dissent pointed out in the
BIA's vacated opinion in R-A-, the purpose and effect of domestic violence is to
control women "'in the one space traditionally dominated by women, the
home." 2 '
In most domestic violence cases, defining the particular social group repre-
sents a threshold issue, since U.S. adjudicators generally eschew groups defined
solely based on gender, and a particular social group can never be defined in
terms of the feared persecution."' So far, the BIA has issued only two decisions
221. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 9o6, 939 (B.I.A. 1999) (Guendelsberger, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess.,
Supp. No. 38, para. 26, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992)), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 9o6
(Att'y Gen. 2001). R-A-, which was vacated by Attorney General Janet Reno in
January 2001, involved a Guatemalan woman who had suffered horrific violence
at the hands of her husband. In its vacated opinion, the BIA indicated for the first
time that Acosta was not the "ending point" for social group analysis, setting forth
additional "factors" that it considered relevant to determining whether a particu-
lar social group exists in an individual case, including whether the group is iden-
tified by the applicant's society as a subdivision of society. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at
919-20. The case was remanded to the BIA for reconsideration after finalization of
the INS's draft regulations on "membership of a particular social group," pro-
posed in December 2000. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg.
76588, 76598 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 2o8). Two years later, in
February 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft removed R-A- from the jurisdic-
tion of the BIA and certified it to himself. Shortly before leaving office in January
2005, Ashcroft remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration following publi-
cation of the proposed rule. In September 20o8, Attorney General Mukasey certi-
fied R-A- to himself and issued a decision ordering the BIA to reconsider it, re-
moving the requirement that the BIA await the issuance of proposed regulations.
R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att'y Gen. 20o8).
222. Internationally, two of the most significant decisions that have accepted a particu-
lar social group based on gender in claims involving domestic violence are Islam v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) (appeal taken
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in cases involving domestic violence, both of which demonstrate its reluctance
to define the particular social group in terms of gender. The first case, R-A-,
which Attorney General Reno vacated in 2001, rejected a group defined as
"Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan
male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination,"
based, in part, on the finding that Guatemalan society did not perceive such a
group to exist.223 In the other case, S-A-, which involved a Moroccan woman
who was physically, verbally, and emotionally abused by her father, the BIA
found that the persecution was "on account of her religious beliefs, as they dif-
fered from those of her father concerning the proper role of women in Mo-
roccan society."2 4 The BIA reached this conclusion despite the absence of any
evidence regarding the applicant's religious beliefs or those of her father. By
basing its decision on religion rather than gender, the BIA found this case "dis-
tinguishable on the facts from circuit court decisions holding that persecution
on account of gender alone does not constitute persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group."2 5 Thus, the BIA abandoned the par-
ticular social group category altogether in analyzing the claim.
Instead of making such a disingenuous move, applicants whose claims are
related to domestic violence often define the particular social group based on
various characteristics in addition to gender, such as marital status. For exam-
ple, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) 2004 brief in R-A-, defined
the social group as "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the
relationship." ' 6 The DHS argued that this group satisfies the social perception
from Eng.) (U.K.) (holding that "women in Pakistan" constitute a particular so-
cial group due to the systemic discrimination again women in Pakistani society);
and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar [2002] 210 C.L.R. 1
(Austl.) (same). In Khawar, Chief Justice Gleeson concluded that "[w]omen in
any society are a distinct and recognisable group; and their distinctive attributes
and characteristics exist independently of the manner in which they are treated,
either by males or by governments." Id. paras. 34-35. He stressed that "[n]either
the conduct of those who perpetrate domestic violence, or of those who withhold
the protection of the law from victims of domestic violence, identifies women as a
group." Id. para. 35 (Gleeson, C.J.). As previously noted, however, U.S. adjudica-
tors have been reluctant to follow suit.
223. R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 917-18 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att'y
Gen. 2001), remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att'y Gen. 2005); see also supra note
221.
224. S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1329-30, 1336 (B.I.A. 2000). The applicant's father
burned her thighs with a heated razor for wearing a short skirt, beat her at least
once a week, and forbade her from leaving her home after he saw her speaking to
a man on the street. Id. at 1329-30.
225. Id. at 1336 (citing Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 947 F.2d 660 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
226. Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respondent's Eligibility for Re-
lief 25, DHS brief submitted in R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). The DHS
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test because it "may reflect a societal view that the status of a wife places a
woman into a segment of society that will not be accorded protection from
harm inflicted by a spouse." '227 In other words, the DHS argued that Guate-
malan society perceives individuals who do not receive state protection from
physical harm differently from those who do, and that married women are a
segment of society falling into the first category. Even if the DHS is correct in
stating that this group satisfies the social perception test, the group is neverthe-
less likely to fail the BIA's social visibility test because the general population in
Guatemala would not automatically recognize which women are married and
unable to leave their relationships. In other words, Guatemalan society may
recognize the abstract group proposed by the DHS, but the group's members
are not socially visible, as required by C-A-. Moreover, if the BIA takes the po-
sition that not all families are socially visible, then it is also likely to assert that
many marital relationships (which comprise a subset of the family unit) may
not be socially visible.
Even if the BIA were to accept "married women who are unable to leave the
relationship" as a socially visible group this would not resolve the challenges
posed by the social visibility test in domestic violence cases. One important
concern is that the social visibility test would automatically privilege claims
brought by married women because the most socially legitimate relationships,
i.e. marriages, enjoy the greatest social visibility; relationships deemed illegiti-
mate, on the other hand, are likely to be concealed by the partners or those
around them."' Thus, women who are abused by boyfriends or same-sex part-
ners will have particular difficulty in satisfying the "social visibility" test. Such
privileging of marital status already is apparent in forced abortion cases where
U.S. courts have found that the husband of a woman required to terminate a
pregnancy is eligible for asylum, but a boyfriend is not, although he suffers the
same harm of having his child forcibly aborted. 9 Even in jurisdictions where
gender-related claims, including those based on domestic violence, are firmly
established, particular social groups involving unmarried women prove chal-
lenging. For example, Australian courts have rejected "young single women" in
China and "unwed mothers in Japan" as particular social groups, and have ex-
pressed doubts about "single women" or "single women without protection in
not only recommended that R-A- be granted asylum, but also "elaborated a well-
reasoned, 'immutability' modeled analysis of [membership of a particular social
group], and essentially recognized that gender could define a [particular social
group]." Anker, supra note 24, at 204. The initial formulation of the particular so-
cial group in this case was rather poor, as it was defined as "Guatemalan women
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who be-
lieve that women are to live under male domination." R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 911.
227. Brief of DHS at 25, R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
228. EDWARD LAUMANN, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1994).
229. See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Sri Lanka," although they have accepted "single women in India" as a particular
social group."' By privileging claims brought by heterosexual, married women,
the social visibility test would strengthen this trend and have the ironic effect of
excluding some of the most vulnerable victims of domestic violence.
Finally, the BIA's interpretation of "social visibility" as an all-or-nothing
phenomenon may encourage claimants and their representatives to portray
women's rights in a particular society as fixed and absolute, rather than as "ne-
gotiated and changing cultural constructs, produced in response to lived reali-
ties, through debates that are now going on all over the world, through the
voices of women and men who want either to retain or to change the present
situation." '' Both C-A- and A-M-E- seem to operate on the assumption that
social perceptions (and the underlying norms that shape them) are static and
unchanging. Under the BIA's social visibility test, it will therefore be even more
difficult to submit gender-based claims in ways that do not simply "recirculate
ahistorical images of immigrant women as backward, passive, and dependent
victims of third-world patriarchy."23
3. Claims Based on Human Trafficking
Victims and potential victims of trafficking represent another group whose
members are invisible. The United Nations has defined "trafficking" as trapping
someone by means of threats, force or other forms of coercion, or by abuse of
vulnerability, and transporting that person for the purpose of exploitation,
which can include prostitution, slavery or the removal of organs 3 3 While the
phenomenon of trafficking is now well-known and recognized by societies
around the world, its actual victims still remain largely unknown and undiscov-
ered. In fact, a recent study of trafficking patterns in the Balkan region found
that although the total number of trafficking victims is increasing, their visibil-
ity is decreasing. The study explained that "[tihe lack of visibility in trafficking
has been due to changed methods of operation, changes in sexual exploitation
taken into private contexts such as private apartments, internet and phone
communication, victims being given small payments and the recruitment of
230. See Michael A. Ross & Patricia Milligan-Baldwin, THE INTERPRETATION OF MEM-
BERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 37 (20o6), available at
http://www.iarlj.org/conferences/mexico/images/stories/forms/WPPapers/Michae10/20
Ross.pdf.
231. ZIBA MIR-HosSEINI, ISLAM AND GENDER: THE RELIGIOUS DEBATE IN CON-
TEMPORARY IRAN 6 (2002).
232. EITHNE LUIBHID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 140
(2002).
233. G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
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women as traffickers and pimps." 234 Factors such as fear of retaliation, fear of
arrest, isolation, lack of social support, shame and stigma, a sense of learned
helplessness, and lack of knowledge of available services also keep victims of
trafficking socially invisible.235 For example, "human trafficking for sexual ex-
ploitation in Brazil was viewed as an isolated phenomenon" for decades, as
"[t] he victims' lack of visibility made it difficult for them to identify those who
could help." 36 More importantly, however, most victims of trafficking "are
rarely seen in public places. Hidden from view, they toil in sweatshops, brothels,
farms, and private homes."2 37 Their captors employ various means to ensure
that they do not escape, including "confiscat[ing] their identification docu-
ments, forbid[ding] them from leaving their workplaces or contacting their
families, threaten[ing] them with arrest and deportation, and restrict[ing] their
access to the surrounding community. ' ' 3'
The UNHCR's Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, issued in 2002,
specifically recognize that trafficking imposes
serious restrictions on a woman's freedom of movement, caused by
abduction, incarceration, and/or confiscation of passports or other
identity documents, [and that trafficked women may] face serious re-
percussions after their escape and/or upon return, such as reprisals or
retaliation from trafficking rings or individuals, real possibilities of be-
ing re-trafficked, severe community or family ostracism, or severe dis-
crimination.239
The control tactics used by traffickers and captors not only render victims of
trafficking literally invisible to the outside world, but also destroy their sense of
identity. Psychiatrist Judith Herman explains: "[I1n situations of captivity, the
perpetrator becomes the most powerful person in the life of the victim, and the
psychology of the victim is shaped by the actions and beliefs of the perpetra-
234. Ladan Rahmani, Invisible Routes: An Exploratory Study of Changing Patterns and
Trends in Routes of Trafficking in Persons in the Balkan Region, in TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE - A THREAT TO HUMAN SECURITY: 11TH WORK-
SHOP OF THE STUDY GROUP "REGIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE" 77,
78 (Nilufer Narli ed., 2oo6) available at http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf pool/
publikationen/io-wgnitrafpers_5o.pdf.
235. FREE THE SLAVES & THE HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, HID-
DEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (2004), available at
http://hrc.berkeley.edu/download/hiddenslaves-report.pdf.
236. Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, Program
Helps Trafficking Victims in Brazil Rebuild Their Lives, Feb. 23, 2007,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2007/February/2007o223o81o59
AKllennoCcMo.548467.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
237. FREE THE SLAVES & THE HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 235, at 5.
238. Id.
239. UNHCR, Gender Guidelines, supra note 198, para. 18.
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tor."2 40 The methods of establishing control are based on "the organized tech-
niques of disempowerment and disconnection," so as to "instill terror and help-
lessness and to destroy the victim's sense of self in relationship to others."' 4 1
In addition, victims of trafficking remain invisible because they are put to
work in sectors that remain largely unregulated, including the sex industry,
domestic services, and agriculture. Lack of adequate legal protection for work-
ers in these sectors, coupled with the difficulty involved in monitoring working
conditions and compliance with labor laws, allows "unscrupulous employers
and criminal networks to gain virtually complete control over workers' lives"
and contributes to the invisibility of the workers themselves. 4 ' For example, in
the United States, household workers are denied certain protections and limited
in their ability to organize because they are not considered "employees" under
the National Labor Relations Act?43 Their invisibility as employees in the eyes of
the law reflects their general invisibility in society.
Women who are trafficked for non-sexual forms of forced labor often re-
main particularly invisible precisely because their work is not criminalized and
neither the police nor the public take much, if any, interest in their places of
business. Whether or not prostitution is legal, it is not often accepted as an en-
tirely legitimate profession, which means that prostitutes will be subject to the
public gaze and to regimes of social control. Spatial segregation of sex workers
into "red light districts" is one mechanism of social control that necessarily in-
creases the visibility of sex workers. 44 By contrast, individuals engaged in do-
mestic services remain tucked away in private homes and are veiled from view
"by a series of practices that enable and enhance tropes of invisibility."2 45 Rivas
remarks that "[i]mmigrant women are the caregivers par excellence because
both they and their work are often rendered invisible."2 46 Since domestic work-
ers often live in complete isolation from the public view, become personally in-
visible within the domestic sphere, and perform work that society erases as a
form of labor, they remain socially invisible on multiple levels.
240. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 75 (1997).
241. Id.
242. FREE THE SLAVES & THE HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., supra note 235, at 1.
243. Id. at 15; see also Mika Toyota, Health Concerns of 'Invisible' Cross-Border Domestic
Maids in Thailand, 2 ASIAN POPULATION STUD. 19, 19 (2006) (discussing how
Burmese maids in Thailand remain invisible because "domestic work is not rec-
ognized as a formal occupation" and domestic workers are "normally out of reach
of labour unions, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations and
public health services").
244. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 132, at 287 (2006) (discussing the red light district of Ka-
mathipura in Mumbai, India, as "an object that can and must be seen," and the
"proliferation of visual representations of the district").
245. Radhika Chopra, Invisible Men: Masculinity, Sexuality, and Male Domestic Labor,
in 9 MEN AND MASCULINITIES 152, 156-57 (2006).
246. Rivas, supra note 153, at 76.
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This discussion demonstrates that a "social visibility" requirement may im-
pose significant new challenges for asylum claims brought by female victims of
trafficking, especially women trafficked for non-sexual forms of forced labor.2 47
In the case of SB, which found that former victims of trafficking for sexual ex-
ploitation constitute a particular social group but that other former victims of
trafficking do not, the UKAIT accounted for evidence about how Moldovan so-
ciety perceives the phenomenon of trafficking and how it perceives victims of
trafficking in the abstract, without requiring the actual victims of trafficking to
be recognizable.24 s The BIA's decision in C-A-, on the other hand, indicates that
the group members themselves must be socially visible.2 49 This critical distinc-
tion may well result in the denial of many asylum claims based on trafficking
under the "social visibility" test, despite the significant international attention
that the issue of trafficking has attracted over the past decade. 50 Excluding vic-
247. While the phrase "trafficking in women" is often used almost synonymously with
trafficking for prostitution, it appears that the vast majority of women are traf-
ficked for non-sexual forms of forced labor. According to the International Labor
Organization, less than 10% of the 9.5 million victims of human trafficking in Asia
are trafficked for commercial sex work. David A. Feingold, Think Again: Human
Trafficking, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 26, available at
http://www.hrusa.org/workshops/trafficking/ThinkAgain.pdf. Forced labor for
prostitution and sex services comprises less than half (46%) of the total forced
labor in the United States; other major sectors of the U.S. economy utilizing
forced labor include domestic services (27%), agriculture (lo%), sweatshop/factory
(5%), and restaurant and hotel work (4%). See FREE THE SLAVES & THE HUMAN
RIGHTS CTR., supra note 235, at 1.
248. SB [2OO8] UKAIT 00002, available at http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/Upload/j2o87/
00002_ukait_20o8 sb-moldova_cg.doc.
249. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 96o-61 (B.I.A. 2006).
250. In 2000, the United Nations adopted the Convention Against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime and the accompanying Protocol To Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. G.A. Res. 55/25, supra
note 233. In 2004, the UN established a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Hu-
man Beings, Especially Women and Children, and, two years later, it issued its
guidelines on trafficking in persons. UNHCR, Trafficking Guidelines, supra note
198. The United States has also taken serious steps to prevent trafficking during
the past decade. In 2000, Congress passed the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Vio-
lence Protection Act, which criminalized procuring and subjecting another hu-
man being to peonage, involuntary sex trafficking, slavery, involuntary servitude,
or forced labor, as well as withholding or destroying documents as part of the
trafficking scheme. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 1O6-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000))
[hereinafter TVPA]. The TVPA established the Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons in the U.S. State Department, which reports annually on
the efforts of countries around the world to combat human trafficking, based on
compliance with a set of minimum standards, and classifies countries into three
categories: full compliance (Tier 1), making significant efforts to comply (Tier 2),
or not in compliance and not making significant efforts to become so (Tier 3). Id.
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tims and potential victims of trafficking under the "social visibility" test would
contradict not only the UNHCR's Guidelines on Membership in a Particular So-
cial Group, but also its Guidelines on Trafficking, adopted in April 2006, which
confirm that "women," "certain subsets of women," and "former victims of
trafficking" may constitute particular social groups.25' This result would also
contradict decisions by numerous foreign courts finding that a particular social
group exists in trafficking cases.252
In 2003, Congress reauthorized the TVPA, allotting additional measures and
funding to fight trafficking. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 1O8-193, 117 Stat. 2875.
251. UNHCR, Trafficking Guidelines, supra note 198, paras. 38-39; see also Edwards, su-
pra note 14, at 61 ("There is no reason why a victim of trafficking, who fears re-
turning home due to the real possibility of being re-trafficked, targeted for re-
prisals, or threatened with death, should not be granted refugee status where the
State of origin is unable or unwilling to protect that person against such harm.").
252. The only published U.S. asylum decision addressing trafficking is Rreshpja v. Gon-
zales, 42o F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005), which rejected a particular social group de-
fined as "young (or those who appear to be young), attractive Albanian women
who are forced into prostitution," in part, because the group was improperly de-
fined in terms of the feared persecution. Adjudicators in Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom, however, have all accepted particular social
groups defined primarily by gender in trafficking cases. See, e.g., SXPB v. Minister
for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, (2005) FCA 111o paras. 30-
36 (Fed. Ct.) (Austl.) (accepting "young women in Albania" as a particular social
group in a case involving a mother and daughter who feared being sold to a traf-
ficker); SZBFQ v. Minister for Immigration & Anor [2005] F.C.M.A. 197 (Fed.
Magis. Ct. June iO, 2005) (Austl.) (holding that the Refugee Review Tribunal erred
in finding that "women in Azerbaijan" did not constitute a particular social group
in a case involving an ethnic Russian woman who feared being trafficked for pros-
titution); No. VO1/13o62 (2004) R.R.T.A. 221 (Refugee Rev. Trib. March 16, 2004)
(Austl.) (accepting "single women without male protection" as a particular social
group in a case involving an Albanian woman who feared being trafficked for
prostitution); No. No3/45573 (2003) R.R.T.A. 16o paras. 70-74 (Refugee Rev. Trib.
February 24, 2003) (Austl.) (finding that "Shan women," "trafficked Shan
women," "women who have been working in prostitution in countries
neighbouring Burma," and "women who have left or been forced to leave Burma
illegally" all constitute particular social groups); Zheng v. Minister of Citizenship
& Immigration, [2002] F.C.J. No. 580; 2002 F.C.T. 448 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.) (Can.)
(finding that the applicant, who was smuggled from China to Canada when she
was fourteen years old, belonged to the particular social group defined as "young,
female, rural Fujanese"); X, TA4-i6915, [2006] CanLII 52155, at 3 (Immigration &
Refugee Bd., Refugee Protection Div. Mar. 16) (recognizing "single women who
were trafficked in Ethiopia" as a particular social group); No. 75233, slip op. paras.
26-27 (Refugee Status App. Auth. Feb. 1, 2005) (N.Z.), available at
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF2005o2ol-75233.pdf (accepting the
particular social group defined as "women of a minority clan" where the
Somalian applicant feared being forced into prostitution); JO [2004] UKAIT oo25i,
http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/Upload/lO32/2004-ukiatoo251joo-nigeria.doc (last
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CONCLUSION
In recent years, the federal courts of appeal have "repeatedly excoriated
immigration judges" for "a pattern of biased and incoherent decisions in asy-
lum cases."2" ' The BIA's new "social visibility" test will greatly compound this
problem, leading to even more inconsistent and unintelligible decisions that
will destroy consensus in U.S. jurisprudence, created by Acosta, around the
definition of "membership in a particular social group." This Article shows that
the new "social visibility" test represents a sudden, unexplained departure from
U.S. precedent and the dominant view of the international community. The
BIA's interpretation of "social visibility" also contradicts Australia's "social per-
ception" approach and the UNHCR's understanding of that analytical mode. In
demanding that the members of a social group be publicly visible, not just that
the group as a whole be distinct, and in focusing on subjective perceptions, the
BIA's "social visibility" test remains unique and unprecedented among State
Parties' interpretations of "membership in a particular social group." While
there is relatively little scholarly writing on the "social perception" approach,
what does exist underscores the inconsistencies between the international
community's understanding of this term and the BIA's new "social visibility"
test.
25 4
As a matter of law, as well as policy, adjudicators should eschew the BIA's
new emphasis on visibility in defining a particular social group. The Acosta
standard reflects the basic concept that "the Refugee Convention protects cer-
tain rights because of their intrinsic importance. Such protection is not made
visited Nov. 19M 20o8) (expressing a "provisional view" that the particular social
group could be defined as "women in Nigeria" in a case involving a young Nige-
rian woman who was trafficked for prostitution).
253. Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
26, 2005, at Ai. Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that "adjudication of these cases at the administrative level
has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice." Id. Similarly, Judge
Marsha S. Berzon of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described an
immigration judge's decision as "literally incomprehensible," "incoherent," and
"indecipherable," finding that it "defie[d] parsing under ordinary rules of English
grammar." Id. In 2004, immigration cases, mostly involving asylum seekers, ac-
counted for about 17% of all federal appeals cases, up from just 3% in 2001. Id. In
New York and California, nearly 40% of federal appeals involved immigration
cases. Id. The increase occurred after Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted a
controversial new regulation that allows "streamlinled]" review, whereby one
member of the BIA may summarily affirm without opinion the decision of an
immigration judge. Id.
254. See generally FOSTER, supra note 3, at 292-303; Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 294
(both discussing Australia's social perception test).
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contingent on whether those rights can be hidden," '255 nor should it be contin-
gent on whether those rights are visible. The BIA's new focus on "visibility"
contradicts the very logic of the "protected characteristic" approach, which cre-
ated a disciplined and principled framework for analyzing social group claims,
This approach, based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, is grounded in the
language of the refugee definition and consistent with the preamble's focus on
antidiscrimination and protection of fundamental human rights; it reflects the
context of the modern human rights movement in which the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention has its roots, as well as the historical concerns of the delegates.
The "social perception" and "social visibility" approaches, on the other
hand, are not based on the text, context, or purpose of the Convention, and
therefore derive no support from the general rules of interpretation set forth in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. By focusing on the
mindset and views of the relevant society, rather than the predicament of the
claimant, these approaches distort the refugee definition.5 6 Furthermore, they
are inherently difficult to apply due to the highly context-dependent nature of
social perception. These sociological approaches will create numerous practical
challenges for adjudicators, who will struggle to derive subjective social percep-
tions from the types of "objective" background evidence generally submitted in
support of asylum claims, leading to contradictory decisions. Decision-makers
also will be more likely to confuse and conflate the different elements of the
refugee condition in the absence of direct evidence about social perception, be-
cause they will be forced to rely on evidence that a group has been targeted for
harm to determine whether it is recognized by society. Adjudicators could easily
avoid such chaos by remaining true to Acosta's law-based standard.
Insofar as one of the assumptions underlying the "social visibility" ap-
proach is that a group is not vulnerable to persecution if it is not visible, such
reasoning is flawed on multiple levels. First, it improperly conflates the "perse-
cution," "well-founded fear," "nexus," and "particular social group" elements
255. No. 74665/03, slip op. para. 81 (Refugee Status App. Auth. July 7, 2004) (N.Z.),
available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/REF-2004o7o774665.pdf
(emphasis added).
256. Even Australia, which considers social perception, recognizes that the Conven-
tion's definition of a refugee focuses on the reasons of the claimant's predicament
rather than on the mindset of the persecutor. See Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 201 C.L.R. 293 paras. 33, 65 (Austl).;
see also No. 72635/01, slip op. para. 168 (Refugee Status App. Auth. Sept. 6, 2002)
(N.Z.), available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/PDFs/ReL20o2o9o6
_72635.pdf (emphasizing the focus on the claimant's predicament); Haines, supra
note 2, at 325 (stressing that the inquiry into whether an individual is entitled to
refugee protection must focus on that individual's specific characteristics and cir-
cumstances, "who that individual is or what he or she believes and the reason why
that person is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of the
country of origin"); James C. Hathaway, Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Con-
vention Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 215 (2002) (emphasizing that in analyzing
the causal link, "[tihe focus [is] on the applicant's predicament").
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of the refugee definition. Second, if visibility were required to be vulnerable to
persecution, then it would be required for each of the protected grounds, not
just membership of a particular social group. Making visibility a requirement
for membership of a particular social group, when it is not a requirement for
the protected grounds of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, contra-
dicts the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Third, this assumption ignores the ways
in which power relations directly shape social identities and influence the rela-
tive visibility or invisibility of various groups.25 7 Socially marginalized groups
often are stripped of social agency and denied the ability to define their own
identities; those in power determine whether and how they are seen. Negating a
marginalized group's identity may even be integral to the identity of the domi-
nant group.25s This is particularly true in situations of intense conflict, where
social identities are often perceived and debated as "zero-sum," as if "A's iden-
tity can be recognized and expressed only if B's identity is denied and sup-
pressed."'25 9 Requiring marginalized groups to be socially visible may therefore
paradoxically demand that they be recognized by the very people who have de-
nied or suppressed their identities. 6 '
Asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender provide helpful ex-
amples for understanding the relationship between oppression and invisibility,
as well as the detrimental impact that the "social visibility" test may have on
some of the most vulnerable groups. Given that the principled human rights
paradigm has played a key role in the development of asylum claims related to
sexual orientation and gender, embracing the inherently incoherent "social
257. See, e.g., Taylor & Spencer, supra note 148, at 4 (drawing on the views of Michel
Foucault and Jacques Lacan in discussing how "social identity is directly related to
discourses of power"). In analyzing the relationship between "visibility" and
power, Kenji Yoshino argues that "[tihere is no innate connection between visi-
bility and political powerlessness, nor is there an innate connection between in-
visibility and political power. Rather, the net effects of visibility will depend on
context, sometimes disempowering a group and sometimes empowering it." Yo-
shino, supra note 120, at 537 (footnotes omitted).
258. Herbert C. Kelman, The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution: Experi-
ences from Israeli-Palestinian Problem-Solving Workshops, in 3 SOCIAL IDENTITY,
INTERGROUP CONFLICT, AND CONFLICT REDUCTION 192 (Richard D. Ashmore,
Lee Jussim & David Wilder eds., 2001).
259. Id. at 194.
260. Cf. Michael Pickering, Racial Stereotypes, in SOCIAL IDENTITIES: MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY APPROACHES, supra note 148, at 102-03 (discussing how individuals who are
"racially marked" by stereotypes must strive for self-worth and self-creation
"within the dominant/subordinate relations of the racist culture," and how their
"struggle for identity is confined to recognition by those who have denied their
identity").
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visibility" test could negate many of the achievements that have been gained in
these areas over the past two decades. 6
In short, the "social visibility" test effectively gives decision-makers total
discretion to decide whether or not a particular social group exists. Since the
test is not law-based and social perceptions are so fluid, adjudicators will be able
to deny freely the existence of a particular social group, despite the existence of
a protected characteristic, based on a finding that the group is not socially visi-
ble. Moreover, since the BIA has not adequately defined social visibility, the
amount of discretion remains virtually unlimited. Embracing the BIA's new ap-
proach not only will lead to chaotic case law and abdication of the United
States' obligations under the Convention, but also will cause the legal commu-
nity to reject the refugee status determination as a serious, principled process.
261. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 26; Anker, supra note 12, at 391-92; Jacqueline Bhabha,
Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human
Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155 (2002); Binaifer A. Davar, Rethinking Gender-
Related Persecution, Sexual Violence, and Women's Rights: A New Conceptual
Framework for Political Asylum and International Human Rights Law, 6 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 241 (1997); Edwards, supra note 14, at 49; Ryan Goodman, Note, The
Incorporation of International Human Rights Standards into Sexual Orientation
Asylum Claims: Cases of Involuntary "Medical" Intervention, 105 YALE L.J. 255
(1995); Haines, supra note 199, at 322 (discussing how the analysis and under-
standing of sex and gender in refugee law has run parallel to and been assisted by
developments in international human rights law and international humanitarian
law); James Hathaway, The Relationship Between Human Rights and Refugee Law:
What Refugee Law Judges Can Contribute, in INT'L Assoc. OF REFUGEE LAW
JUDGES, THE REALITIES OF REFUGEE DETERMINATION ON THE EVE OF A NEW
MILLENNIUM: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 86 (1998); Nancy Kelly, Gender-
Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
625, 633 (1993); Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review
of United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum
Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 28-30 (1998).
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